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Nature, as the saying goes, makes no jumps and passes 
from extreme to extreme only through a mean. 
JohnRay1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The context of exchange determines the substance exchanged, and con-
text is the expression of relation. That conception of the province of Con-
tract reformulates doctrine in a way that implies the operation and 
cooperation of the elements of exchange in a manner not appreciated by the 
current models. The revised perspective, a reconception of the substance 
and function of the basic building blocks of Contract, reveals the evanes-
cent but, paradoxically, substantial foundation of the law governing the en-
forcement of promises. Principles of philosophical naturalism confirm the 
coherence of this reconception. 
We have a good deal to learn from conceiving of Contract as akin to 
science-from formulating the fit between Contract jurisprudence and the 
"scientific" form of inquiry to reveal the limits of our explanations for why 
and when promises bind? While there is a developed vocabulary to inform 
• Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary School of Law. I thank those who at-
tended colloquia at the Washington and Lee University and College of William and Mary Schools of 
Law where drafts of this paper were presented and, specifically, my colleagues Richard Hynes, Alan 
Meese, Alemante Selassie, David Snyder, and Cynthia Ward, whose reactions to previous drafts and 
conversations with me contributed to the finished product. I am, of course, solely responsible for the 
deficiencies that remain. 
1 JOHN RAY, Preface to METHOD US PLANT ARUM (1682). 
2 Understand that the Contract "science" posited here is not a reprise of the "science" of the Nine-
teenth-century formalists, whose 
scientific aspirations ... were based on the idea that legal principles were 'out there,' beyond the 
reach of conscious decision-makers in the same sense as the principles of natural science. [T]he 
formalists believed that the task of legal scholarship was to describe those principles, and then 
construct prescriptions that would be fully dependent on them. 
Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 521, 525. The argument ad-
vanced here does not hold out hope for an immanent law awaiting discovery. Instead, the argument of 
this article is for reconception of the elements of Contract in a manner that would facilitate focus on the 
elements' interrelation in order to provide a means to appreciate degrees of promise enforcement ration-
alized in terms of the extent of the damages awardable. 
For discussions of the formalistic legal "science," see Thomas Grey, Langdel/'s Orthodoxy, 45 U. 
39 
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the Contracts pedagogy,3 the lack of descriptive (and prescriptive) precision 
frustrates efforts to order Contract theory in a manner that would distin-
guish change from progress.4 When the object of scientific inquiry provides 
a template, the fabric of Contract becomes manifest in epistemological pat-
terns that accommodate a richer sense of the fit among the values, princi-
ples, and rules that inform resolution of recurring controversies. 
You get the sense from Paul Hoyningen-Huene's construction of 
science: 
The following may be said about all science, whenever conducted: 
-Science studies nature, or the world. 
-Science aims at an understanding of nature or the world which captures 
its order with maximum precision and universality. 
-Science's orientation toward this goal demands that it search for a set of 
propositions exhibiting maximal internal coherence and maximal correspon-
dence with nature or the world. 
-Science is mostly detail work; it strives toward its understanding of na-
ture or the world by way of precise understanding of the individual aspects of 
nature or the world. 
-Science proceeds empirically; in other words, the acceptability of propo-
sitions is strongly regulated by observation and experience. 
-Therefore, there exists a universal characterization both of the production 
methods of scientific knowledge and of the type of arguments that may be 
used in support of claims to such epistemic status.5 
To the extent that the word "science" in that excerpt could be replaced by 
"Contract theory,"6 the sense of science proposed here is captured by Hoyn-
PJTI. L. REv. 1 (1983) and Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1995). 
3 The vocabulary includes, for example, consideration, offer, acceptance, agreement, capacity, and 
bargain. These terms are only intended as exemplars of the rational units that have currency in the Con-
tract law. They recur throughout this paper as representatives of the analytical tools that they signifY, 
not as the sum and substance of Contract. 
4 Goetz and Scott acknowledged at the outset of their inquiry into the basis of Contract that "com-
mon law 'bargain theory' is classically simple: bargained-for promises are presumptively enforceable; 
nonreciprocal promises are presumptively unenforceable. But this disarmingly simple theory has never 
mirrored reality." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis 
ofContract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1261-62 (1980). 
5 PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCfiNG SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: THOMAS S. KUHN'S 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 23 (Alexander J. Levine trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1993) (1989). 
Edward Wilson has also offered conceptions of science: 
Science is neither a philosophy nor a belief system. It is a combination of mental operations that 
has become increasingly the habit of educated peoples, a culture of illuminations hit upon by a for-
tunate turn of history that yielded the most effective way of learning about the real world ever 
conceived. 
EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE 45 (1998). "[S]cience to put its warrant as concisely as possible, is 
the organized, systematic enterprise that gathers knowledge about the world and condenses the knowl-
edge into testable laws and principles." /d. at 53 (emphasis added). 
6 It might likewise be worthwhile to replace the word "nature" with the term "human nature." What 
remains, though, is to circumscribe the scope of Contract, to determine where Contract ends and some 
other legal category, perhaps Tort, begins. That distinction is substantial only if there is a fiXed or even 
40 
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ingen-Huene. 
Also, replacing the term "nature or the world" with "the enforceability 
of promises" captures the dual descriptive and normative functions of this 
reconception: Contract theory's orientation toward the goal of understand-
ing the enforceability of promises "demands that it search for a set of 
propositions exhibiting maximal internal coherence and maximal corre-
spondence with"7 the reasons why we enforce promises and the circum-
stances in which contracts are performed.8 
The formulation of Contract theory too is "detail work," no matter the 
perspective of the Contract theorist. While it may usually suffice to apply 
rules of general application (the writing requisite, for instance), the apolo-
gist for the rule (the statute of frauds) will recite reasons for the rule (per-
haps cautionary and evidentiary)9 that vindicate a more fundamental 
fiXable distinction between the law of consensual and non consensual relations. The formulation of that 
distinction presents a formidable challenge, and one without the scope of this study. For present pur-
poses, to appreciate the parallel between theories of science and theories of Contract, it suffices to rec-
ognize that the word "world" in the Hoyningen-Huene excerpt does not undermine the Contract as 
science proposition. Instead, it saves the same place in science as the term "consensual exchange rela-
tions" might in Contract theory. 
Similarly, we could conclude that copyright, and perhaps all of intellectual property law, is a Con-
tract system insofar as it orders consensual exchanges of value. While we can say that rules governing 
consensual exchanges are the stuff of Contract, it is not necessary (indeed, it may be erroneous) to con-
clude that Contract governs only consensual relations. Consent has become (perhaps never was more 
than) a label for a point on a continuum at which a court for reasons related in part to the fact-finder's 
perception of the promisor's state of mind would enforce the promise. It is at best a conclusion, not a 
particularly worthwhile analytical tool. So it might not shock the conscience of too many to enforce 
"promises" that are not the product of consent in the colloquial sense. 
7 HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 23. 
8 The inquiry might be further expanded to take into account the role of the judicial process in the 
enforcement of contracts. That would focus the inquiry on theories of adjudication in Contract and, 
here, is subsumed in a general inquiry into the science of Contract. Courts provide one setting in which 
promises are enforced, but they are neither the exclusive nor even, perhaps, the dominant fora. 
For a comprehensive, and particularly insightful, appreciation of the extra-judicial determinants on 
contract enforceability see HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRAcrs (1999). Robert Hillman's review 
of Collins monograph places the work within the relational contract canon but ultimately fails to appre-
ciate Collins's contribution. See Robert A. Hillman, Regulating Contracts by Hugh Collins, 27 J.L. 
Soc'y 338 (2000) (book review). Ian Macneil has written several important articles positing relational 
contract theory, including Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 483; 
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational 
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); and The Many Futures of Contract, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 
691 (1974). Criticisms of the relational perspective include MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF 
FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 141 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's 
Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992). All of these commentaries are cited by 
Hillman, supra, at 343 nn.l8-22. 
9 E. Allan Farnsworth, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, has explained: 
Attempts at justifying the statute of frauds in this country stress the functions of a formality such 
as a writing. Its original purpose was evidentiary, providing some proof that the alleged agree-
ment was actually made and all its provisions perform this function to some degree. A few provi-
sions perform other functions as well. The suretyship provision performs an important cautionary 
function, by bringing home to the promisor the significance of the promise and preventing ill-
41 
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principle, intent10 or consent, 11 which is in tum vindicated by some even 
more fundamental value, such as individual autonomy. 12 The detail work of 
Contract theory, then, is in identifying the interests implicated in the resolu-
tion of disputes arising from exchange relations. That requires an under-
standing of the bases upon which the assumption of an exchange relation 
are premised as well as the reasons why those bases maintain currency. 
The object of the "detail work" is the identification and elaboration of 
"a set of propositions exhibiting maximal internal coherence and maximal 
correspondence with"13 extant Contract practices and is "strongly regulated 
considered and impulsive promises. The land contract provision performs a significant channeling 
function, by furnishing a simple test of enforceability to mark off unenforceable agreements from 
enforceable ones. It is noteworthy that the most durable and well-regarded of the statute's provi-
sions are those that fulfill more than just the original evidentiary purpose. 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 366 (3d ed. 1999). 
1° Farnsworth developed (or at least, described) the contours of a so-called intention principle in his 
CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 38 (1998) ("[T]he intention to be legally 
bound is a basis for commitment."). Professor Farnsworth did not describe intent as the exclusive basis 
to support commitment; he also found room for the operation of a reliance principle: "'No one can 
change his mind to someone else's disadvantage."' /d. at 2 (quoting Papinian, in 4 THE DIGEST OF 
JUSTINIAN 50.17.75 (Theodore Mommsen & Alan Watson trans., 1985)). 
11 Randy Barnett, for example, has suggested that a consent theory supports Contract, but at the 
level of values rather than principles. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. 
L. REv. 269 (1986). Craswell effectively revealed the deficiencies of Barnett's analysis and conclusion. 
See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 
489, 523-28 (1989). But the point here is not that consent, however construed, explains all of Contract; 
it is only to suggest the relationship between values and principles and among values, principles, and 
rules. The parameters of that trichotomy are considered in Peter A. Alces, Regret and Contract "Sci-
ence," 89 GEO. L.J. 143 (2000). Indeed, it is not even necessary, for the purpose of demonstrating Con-
tract as science, to establish certainly the existence of values that generally animate principles that, in 
tum, animate Contract rules. Jurisprudential analyses of Contract that do not identifY viable fundamen-
tal values, are even skeptical that there are such jurisprudential units in Contract theory, would still sup-
port a Contract as science model. Farnsworth and Craswell each proceed from perspectives not 
informed by a unitary fundamental value, or at least have noted their inability to identifY that value in 
terms that would advance Contract theory: "My own belief is that no single explanation will suffice and 
that the answer is a complex mix of explanations that focus on both promisor and promisee. The in-
stances in which promises should be enforced are too varied to be shoehorned into the confines of a sin-
gle rationale." FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 37. Craswell writes, 
Thus, ethical theories about what kind of promises to make usually derive from theories about the 
particular subject matter of the promise (helping the poor, etc). They do not derive from theories 
about promising as such. 
The same could be true ... concerning the ethical consequences of having made a promise. 
That is, there would be nothing illogical in believing that the conditions under which it is excus-
able to break a promise to the poor have no connection (in the sense of being linked by any com-
mon theory) with the conditions under which it is excusable to break a business promise, or a 
promise to a friend. If that were the case, there would be no point in asking questions about the 
nature of the commitment represented by promises in general. One could speak of the commit-
ment represented by charitable promises, or business promises, but it would be useless to search 
for any general, unifYing theory of promises. 
Craswell, supra, at 492. 
12 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) 
(arguing that conceptions of individual autonomy are fundamental to contract liability). 
13 HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 23. 
42 
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by observation [of] and experience [with]"14 those practices. So to under-
stand Contract it is not enough to read the car rental agreement or dis-
claimer of liability on the back of a receipt or ticket, even if a court would 
enforce the terms of those writings.15 To understand Contract you must 
make sense of the ways the parties to those writings actually behave in the 
course of the exchange relation that the writings memorialize (and the way 
they resolve disputes arising from the relation is only one indicator of the 
parties' contract).16 
The last ofHoyningen-Huene's postulates presents perhaps the greatest 
obstacle to the Contract science: Can we say that, in Contract theory, "there 
exists a universal characterization both of the production methods of [Con-
tract] knowledge and of the type of arguments that may be used in support 
of claims to such epistemic status"?17 An object of this Article is to respond 
to the challenge that postulate presents for development of the Contract 
model. Ultimately, though, this challenge may be related to the unitary the-
ory question, and perhaps is similarly insoluble in the current state of the art. 
The reconception of Contract offered here entails the progression of 
argument through several steps: 
1. There is a discernible intellectual model of science that provides an 
inevitable framework for intellectual inquiry; 
2. The model may be appreciated in terms of Contract; 
3. There is an affinity between the philosophical naturalism of Ameri-
can Legal Realism, a science of adjudication, and the reconception of Con-
tract as a science of doctrine formation that is a constituent of adjudication; 
4. Philosophical naturalism provides an intellectual framework that can 
account for the adjustment of paradigm in response to crises; 
5. Resolution of crises in science entails a reevaluation of the relation 
among the elements of phenomena; 
6. Incommensurability undermines the application of Contract doctrine; 
14 /d. 
15 Compare Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Bums Elec. Sec. Sys., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. 
Ct 1981) (enforcing liability limitation in alarm system contract), and Schutkowski v. Corey, 725 P.2d 
1057 (Wyo. 1986) (enforcing liability limitation against skydiver), with Klar v. H&M Parcel Room, Inc., 
61 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946), af!'d mem., 73 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1947) (refusing to enforce 
limitation of liability on back of parcel receipt), and Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, 
Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. Ct App. 1987) (refusing to enforce signed exculpation agreement upon 
theft of car from dealer's premises). 
16 For one view of the role of dispute resolution, see K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, 
THE CHEYENNE \VA Y: CONFLICf AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941 ): 
Cases (enough of them) do make an intractable body of behavior, to be seen and to be recorded, 
whether it 'fits' or not It is our experience, further, that patterns, attitudes, and strains which are 
peculiar in the culture make themselves felt rather rapidly in the trouble-cases. The felt strains and 
stresses then give leads for inquiry not foreshadowed in the anticipatory plan. 
/d. at40. 
17 HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 23. 
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7. Incommensurability is exacerbated by crises; 
8. Contract reconceived responds to crises in the doctrine by enhancing 
our understanding of the interrelations pertinent to the enforcement of 
promises; and 
9. Study of those relations, as relations rather than as fixed and invari-
able structures, reveals the fit among values, principles, and rules that de-
termines Contract doctrine. 
The three principal parts of this Article develop that analytical frame-
work. 
Part II begins by describing the familiar model of contract formation 
drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. It describes the ele-
ments of Contract as well as the prevailing model's description of their 
combination. From those premises a sense of incommensurability emerges 
that supports a reconception of Contract in terms of the relation among the 
constituent elements in a manner confirmed by analyses of rules and deci-
sions at the margin of the traditional model. Contract "at the margins,"-
promissory estoppel, consequential damages, and unconscionability-
reveals a perspective to reconceive of promise enforcement generally. Part 
III then presents a reconception of the elements of exchange relations, tak-
ing account of recent jurisprudential observations concerning naturalism 
and the parallel between natural science and law. This Part relies upon 
epistemological studies of scientific discovery and development. Finally, 
Part IV posits a relationship among the constituents of Contract that draws 
upon studies of scientific inquiry to describe how an adjustment of our con-
ception of those constituents' interrelation may advance our understanding 
of the law governing exchange. 
The incremental steps offered in this reconception of Contract do not 
either claim or endeavor, deus ex machina, to correct hundreds or even 
thousands of years of human experience that support contemporary Con-
tract. For the most part, Contract law has it right; I do not argue that we 
systematically fail to discriminate correctly between those promises that 
should be enforced and those that should not. It is not coincidence that the 
elements of Contract doctrine reflect an elaboration of the values, princi-
ples, and rules that inform our reaction to exchange relationships. Contract 
doctrine is, to an important extent, organic, the necessary consequence of 
our aspirations and limitations. Indeed, we will see that many of the rules 
of Contract are formulated in terms that are consistent with what a naturalis-
tic perspective would predict. But our patterns of contracting activity 
evolve as a consequence of several factors, including the maturing (or coa-
lescing) of our values, our greater understanding of consequentialist theo-
ries (and their consequences), and technological pressures on the formation 
of interdependent relationships (as well as the resulting redefinition of 
property interests). The evolution of transactional forms increases the dis-
sonance between our relatively static language of Contract and the impor-
tant relationships to which that language pertains as a matter of law. 
44 
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Appreciation of the science of Contract may at least constrain the growth of 
that dissonance and perhaps, in some contexts, demonstrate a viable path to 
greater consonance between Contract terminology and Contract reality. 
Throughout, the object remains the resolution of tension between phenom-
ena and substance, subject and object. 
The rhetoric of Contract generally captures a linear inquiry: We look 
for the satisfaction of each element until we have achieved Contract. But a 
conception of Contract consonant with the modes and object of scientific 
inquiry, as formulated in this Article, contemplates our sensitivity to the in-
terdependence of the elements of Contract. The combination of the ele-
ments, more or less of one compensating for more or less of another, 
determines the extent to which18 a promise supported by the interrelation of 
those elements is enforceable. That perspective captures what we do in de-
ciding whether a promise will be enforced. 
At the outset, it is crucial to make clear the relationship between Con-
tract theory and scientific inquiry that provides the basis for the argument 
advanced here. To that end, Part II posits a Contract model derived from 
common-law principles. That exposition is designed to facilitate a "scien-
tific" conception of the fit among the elements of the model. The word 
"science" invokes certain epistemological (and even political)19 concep-
tions, so the sense in which Contract may be a matter of scientific discovery 
determines the utility of Contract science. The inquiry must begin, then, by 
coming to terms with terms. 
II. THE CONTRACT MODEL OF PROMISE ENFORCEMENT RECONSIDERED 
The premises of Contract are formulated in several sections of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts. And though the structure of the provi-
sions suggests that Contract is the sum of constituent parts, closer 
examination reveals that the crucial concepts proffer shades of the Contracts 
calculus, potentially coincident properties of an exchange relation. The de-
piction of the nature and interrelation of the elements of Contract presented 
in the sections of this Article that follow reveals that if we understand the 
18 Cf. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE 
LJ. 52 (1936). 
In the assessment of damages the law tends to be conceived, not as a purposive ordering of human 
affairs, but as a kind of juristic mensuration. The language of the decisions sounds in terms not of 
command but discovety. We measure the extent of the injucy; we determine whether it was 
caused by the defendant's act; we ascertain whether the plaintiff has included the same item of 
damage twice in his complaint. 
Jd. at 52. 
19 Of course, the word "contract" too invokes certain intellectual and even emotional responses. To 
say that one party has a contract with another is to say that some performance is due, and that may be a 
normative judgment as well. Indeed, the science of Contract may be no more than the study of when 
some performance is due by reference to a package of expectations arising from communication. The 
"justness" of the expectations will be no less in issue than the form and substance of the communication 
and, in fact, may be inextricably intertwined with the mechanics of the communications. 
45 
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elements of Contract as separate and several constituents which combine to 
satisfy "contract," we misunderstand the basis of promise enforcement. The 
foundation of promise enforcement is in the constituent's cooperation, not 
merely in their coincidence. 
A. Reconception of the Additive Formula 
This section presents the conception of Contract depicted in the Re-
statement. It demonstrates the impotency of understanding that model in 
simplistic "additive" terms. Indeed, understanding Contract as the mere 
cumulation rather than dynamic coordination of constituents obscures rather 
than illuminates the tensions informing the formation of enforceable prom-
ises. Section 1 of the Restatement defines "contract" as an enforceable 
"promise."20 Section 2, in turn, provides that a "promise" is a "manifesta-
tion ofintent."21 Then Section 3 defines "agreement" as a "manifestation of 
mutual assent" and "bargain" as an "agreement to exchan~e."22 As a gloss 
on the bargain concept, the official comment to section 3 3 explains that a 
bargain is the product of "offer"24 and "acceptance."25 Section 17 con-
cludes that the formation of a "contract" requires a "bargain" (recall, the 
product of offer and acceptance) in which there is an "agreement" ("mani-
festation of mutual assent") and a "consideration."26 And, finally, section 
71 explains that for a "promise" to constitute "consideration," it must be the 
product of"bargain.'m The sum and substance of those definitions' interre-
lation compels the conclusion that the basis of promise enforcement is the 
inference of volition.28 
To decide whether a promise is enforceable, within the Restatement 
structure, you cannot follow the formation rules and say, for instance, 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ I (1981) ("A contract is a promise or set of promises 
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way rec-
ognizes as a duty."). 
21 /d. § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified 
way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."). 
22 /d.§ 3 ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons."). 
23 See id. § 3 cmt. d ("A bargain is ordinarily made by an offer by one party and an acceptance by 
the other party or parties, the offer specifYing the two subjects of exchange to which the offeror is mani-
festing assent."). 
24 /d. § 24 ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justifY 
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."). 
25 /d. § 50(1) ("Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the 
offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer."). 
26 /d. § 17(1) ("[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration."). 
27 /d. § 71(1) ("To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained 
for."). 
28 Cf Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 
"Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 914 (1985) ("The requirement of a promise makes li-
ability tum on the voluntary assumption of a duty."). 
46 
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"Contract=Agreement+Bargain+Consideration," because Offer and Accep-
tance are constituents of Bargain and also constitute "manifestation of mu-
tual assent," or Agreement. And Consideration is the product of Bargain. 
The elements, such as they are, are not identifiable in isolation but only op-
erate in interdependent combination. They provide alternative means to 
find the inferable volition that the Restatement deems requisite to the en-
forcement of a promise. 
There is flexibility in the Contracts terminology: A range of facts will 
support the legal conclusion of promise enforceability. What matters more 
to the Contract model urged here is that there is flexibility in the relation 
among the elements of Contract. Different transactional patterns invite us 
to understand the elements in relation to one another. In fact, given the 
substance of the elements, they may only be appreciated in relation to one 
another because they are built on the same foundation. They are, to a sig-
nificant extent, tautological: They ask the same or very similar questions. 
At the risk of oversimplifying, but for the sake of offering the contrast 
starkly, it is worthwhile to formulate the familiar model of Contract in these 
terms: A promise that represents the coincidence of an Agreement, a Bar-
gain, and Consideration is enforceable. If any one of those elements is 
missing, the promise is not enforceable, not at all. You could give each of 
the elements a value of 1, and, requiring that we stay in whole numbers, 
conclude that unless the sum of the addition is 3, the promise is not en-
forceable. 
The more accurate reconception of Contract could contemplate the 
same essential elements-Agreement, Bargain, and Consideration-but 
give each a value on a scale of, say, 1 to 10. Then the sum of the constitu-
ent parts, again staying with whole numbers, could be anywhere in the 
range 0 to 30. From that premise, you could imagine that there is sufficient 
basis for the inference of volition when the sum of the constituents is, for 
example, 24. So long as we arrive at any combination of A, B, and C that 
equals 24, we will enforce the promise in issue that is the product of A, B, 
and C. And once we get that far, we can recognize an extent of promise en-
forcement, which becomes a measure of the inference of volition (perhaps 
our certainty of that inference) and determines the damages awardable. 
The contrast between those alternative conceptions may be depicted 
graphically: 
47 
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The area to the right of each curve would describe the combination of 
constituents, in this case the fit between bargain and consideration, neces-
sary and sufficient to promise enforcement. The simple additive formula 
(5+5=10=Contract) is represented by the right-angled curve (x), or Leontief 
Technology/9 and alternative placements of the fixed point C, C1 (for con-
sideration) or B, B 1 (for bargain) would represent alternative judgments 
about the conception of the relationship between two constituents of prom-
ise enforcement. (It would be possible to conceive of more dimensions but 
not possible to graph their cooperation here, in two dimensional representa-
tion.) Curve y depicts a reconception of Contract that would operate were 
we to say that the relation among the points described by the curve would 
support promise enforcement if the combination of bargain and considera-
tion were in the form 6+4, or 7+3, or 8+2. Curve z would depict the relation 
supporting enforcement of Contract that takes an additive form such as 8+4, 
or 11+3, or 15+2 equals promise enforcement. 
Curves y and z are consistent with the reconception of Contract posited 
in this Article. The difference between them is the difference between the 
conclusion that there is a direct relation between the relative degrees of bar-
gain and consideration (curve y) and the conclusion that we need more than 
a single unit of one constituent to compensate for a single unit less of the 
other. I draw no conclusion here about the relative merits of the concep-
tions depicted by curves y and z. The claim here is more modest: Curves y 
and z both more accurately capture the relation of Contract constituents that 
describes promise enforcement. 
It is the difference in contour of the curves that distinguishes the 
reconception of Contract from the static conception suggested in the Re-
statement formation provisions. Superimposed on that conception may be 
the idea of the "extent" of promise enforcement. In this way, the range of 
promises enforceable and the damages recoverable for their breach may be 
appreciated on a continuum. 
Contract so formulated accommodates a conception of the elements of 
promise enforcement in relation to one another, a conception confirmed by 
the common inquiries captured bl each of the elements: Bargain is the 
product of offer and acceptance;3 whether a communication is an offer or 
acceptance turns on the context of the communication and the form of the 
original as well as responsive communications;31 so whether there is a bar-
29 For a definition and description of the Leontif Technology, see HAL R. VARIAN, 
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 10 (1984). 
30 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 3 cmt. d. 
31 See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1990). 
The scores of cases that have sought to determine whether, in a given set of facts, an offer has 
been made, are notoriously deficient in suggesting clear guidelines to determine whether an offer 
exists. A glance at modem cases often reveals an admission that "[i]t is impossible to formulate a 
general principle or criterion for its determination." The rationale for this Jess than helpful conclu-
sion is based on the nature of the question to be determined, which is a question of intention-a 
question of fact-that can only be determined by considering the objective manifestations of the 
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gain is a function of the relationship among the constituents of bargain. 
Further, insofar as the basis of bargain is the same as the basis of agree-
ment-inference of volition-and the same as the basis of consideration as 
well ("mutual promises that are the product of bargain"),32 the three ele-
ments really provide alternative approaches to the fundamental inference of 
volition calculus. Therefore, an understanding of the three elements-
Agreement, Bargain, and Consideration-that recognizes their common ba-
sis (the inference of volition) provides the means to put the determination of 
promise enforceability on a continuum, to conceive of the extent of promise 
enforcement, and thus to resolve ambiguity in the damage measure or in the 
decision to enforce some promises that are constituents of the "contract" 
and not to enforce others. 
We want Contract doctrine to minimize the confusion engendered by 
perceptual discontinuities. Wholly apart from perceptions of the facts 
("What did he say?"), we want to provide the means to determine when the 
facts support the Contract element conclusion ("What facts, if established, 
constitute a manifestation of assent or intent?"). To the extent that the ele-
ments of Contract are dependent upon one another, then, that perception di-
lemma33 (the second parenthetical question, "what facts ... ") can be 
ameliorated if we conceive of Contract in terms that emphasize and give ef-
fect to the interrelation. The more clear the terms of the offer, "I offer X if 
you will agree toY," the less certain the terms of the acceptance need to be; 
"OK" would probably suffice. Similarly, the more certain we may be that 
what one party offers is a "promise," the more likely we will be to conclude 
that the return undertaking is a "consideration" therefor because the parties' 
communications will be the product of "offer" and "acceptance," or, a "bar-
gain." 
Also, if we may both agree that there is a contract but disagree about 
the bases therefor, we would encounter the type of consensus dilemma34 
panics and circumstances under which those manifestations occurred. The only guide suggested 
by the Restatement 2d is oflimited assistance, i.e., whether a purported offeree was justified in un-
derstanding a manifestation of intention as creating a power of acceptance. 
ld. at 68-69. 
32 Cf. Farber & Matheson, supra note 24, at 933 ("Whether manifestations rise to the level of a 
promise depends on various factors, including the clarity of the manifestations, the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the manifestations."). 
33 See Alces, supra note II, at 157 ("[T]he limits imposed on intellectual perception may obscure 
inquiry on too fundamental a level."). 
34 See id. 
[T]o the extent that Values are only revealed in responses to recurring interreactional contexts, the 
variety of contingent experiences and reactions to interreactional contexts may present insur-
mountable obstacles to consensus. Though there may seem to be shared understanding and appre-
ciation of a fundamental Value, the constituent bases of consensus may be different in ways that 
matter in some but not other contexts. That is the consensus dilemma, which would be revealed to 
the extent that the same statement of Values generates different Principles for different actors (and, 
in tum, different Rules). 
!d. (footnote omitted); cf. HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 147 ("[I]n certain stages of scientific 
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that may undermine the development and application of Contract doctrine. 
You could conclude that there is a contract because there was enough 
agreement in light of the consideration in issue. I might conclude that the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction provide the basis to infer a bar-
gain irrespective of the amount in issue. While we both have concluded 
that the promise is enforceable, we have reached that conclusion for reasons 
that are not transparent if the elements of Contract are not appreciated as in-
terdependent but, instead, as discrete elements-the coincidence of which 
determines the enforceability of a promise. The deleterious effects of the 
consensus dilemma, though perhaps not entirely avoided, are reduced sig-
nificantly when the nature of Contract formation rules is conceived in terms 
that accommodate rather than frustrate the application of the familiar forms 
to evolving transactional patterns. The perception and consensus dilemmas, 
as construed here, obscure an incommensurability problem that undermines 
the evolution of Contract in response to shifting patterns of contracting ac-
tivity. That problem is treated in the next section. Recognize first, though, 
that a conception of Contract as the product of the interrelation of familiar 
(though not always fully appreciated) elements of enforceable promises 
provides the means to fix a common vector on which to determine the ex-
tent to which a promise is enforceable: the damage measure. 
Lon Fuller and William Perdue, in terms that have guided the Con-
tracts understanding of 3enerations of lawyers/5 recognized in their seminal 
Reliance Interest article 6 that contract damages resolve into the accommo-
dation of three often coincident "interests": the reliance, restitution, and 
expectation interests. Their conclusion is that, though the Contract dam-
ages rule is expectation, or "benefit of the bargain," a careful reading of the 
cases reveals that courts often vindicate the reliance measure, putting the 
nonbreaching par;.t in the position she would have been in but for the de-
fendant's breach.3 
Craswell pointed out that Fuller's analysis does not explain cases in 
which, for example, the restitution or reliance measure could exceed the ex-
pectation measure or the expectation measure would provide the nonbreach-
development we may find coherent traditions in which there is no agreement on basic ontological ques-
tions." (footnote omitted)). 
35 See Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 99 (2000). 
In I936, Lon Fuller and William Perdue published an article they called "The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages." In the history of contract law, and of American legal thought in general, this 
article stands as a towering classic. It changed forever the way we think about monetary remedies 
for breach of contract. It also exemplified Fuller's particular brand of jurisprudence, showing the 
power of his critique of formalism. 
!d. at 99. 
36 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 18; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937) [hereinafter Fuller & Perdue, Part 2]. 
37 Fuller & Perdue, Part 2, supra note 36, at 4 I 8 ("The cases ... show, we believe, that the contrac-
tual reliance interest receives a much wider (though often covert) recognition in the decisions than it 
does in the textbooks."). 
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ing party less damages than would one or both of the alternative measures.38 
That response, though, fails to capture the sense of Fuller's "interests." A 
richer understanding of the three alternatives-restitution, reliance, and ex-
pectation-as describing interests vindicated by the award of damages 
rather than certain dollar measures on a continuum39 confirms that Fuller 
was describing the perspectives that in combination determine the award 9f 
damages rather than ostensibly certain measures that the courts have con-
founded.40 
Conceived in the way Fuller's coincident interests may be construed, 
the damages awardable in a breach of contract action, the extent, in other 
words, to which a promise is enforceable, fixes the conception of Contract 
that most accurately depicts what we do when we determine the Contract 
formation issues.41 
B. Incommensurability and Promise Enforcement 
Understanding the elements of promise enforcement in relation to one 
another and recognizing that the cooperation among them fixes the contours 
of Contract provides the means to overcome the incommensurability that 
might otherwise undermine the development and application of promise en-
forcement doctrine. Recent inquiry into the existence, nature, and poten-
tially deleterious consequences of incommensurability in the law informs 
the reconception of Contract posited in this Article. This section pursues 
that inquiry in terms that may resonate in Contract formation. A 1998 
Symposium issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review investi-
gated in considerable depth, over five hundred pages, the potential impact 
of the incommensurability phenomenon on the law.42 Actually, a substantial 
38 See Craswell, supra note 35, at 138-54. 
39 See Alces, supra note 11, at 166-68. 
40 !d. at 166. 
41 And, not incidentally, that approach to damages is consistent too with what we expect the Tort 
Jaw to accomplish. Just as the Tort damages create incentives to avoid the consequences of negligence, 
the Contract damages, similarly appreciated, create incentives to avoid the consequences of breached 
promises by providing an award that reflects the extent of our certainty about the parties' intentions to 
be bound. 
42 Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1998). Craswell treated the 
consequences of incommensurability for the law: 
I focus on justifications for decisions because this is when incommensurability becomes important 
for the law (as well as for welfare economics). It is one thing to ask, in the abstract, whether a 
beautiful mountain gorge can meaningfully be valued on the same scale that we use to value 
cheaper electricity. But this question has the most bite when the Jaw for some reason must choose 
between these values-for example, if there is a proposal to build a dam that would flood the 
gorge. Welfare economics purports to offer a basis for evaluating that decision and for justifying 
one choice rather than the other. My interest in incommensurability, therefore, is in the extent to 
which it undermines this justification. 
Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 
1421 (1998). 
On the similar but distinct issue of interpersonal utility comparisons, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legis-
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portion of the issue was devoted to the definition of incommensurability 
followed by ratiocination about its existence.43 The focus of the Sympo-
sium pieces may best be described as "choice incornmensurability.'M 
lation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63 (1990): 
[T]he utility effects of legislation cannot generally be measured by economic criteria, because that 
would require interpersonal utility comparisons. Even with this simple hypothetical vote in a tiny 
society, the utility effects-the subjective pleasure and harm-of the legislation are unknown. 
The individual utility gains of 51 people who voted for the statute may be very small, while the in-
dividual utility losses of the forty-nine opponents quite large. In that case, the legislation would be 
utility-reducing. The important point, however, is that to say that the legislation is not wealth-
maximizing, or allocatively efficient, is to say absolutely nothing about its utility effects. 
Id. at82. 
43 Matthew Adler captured the context: 
What is incommensurability? And what is its significance for law? I here delineate, in a very 
brief and introductory way, the answers that the Symposium participants provide to these ques-
tions. As a threshold matter, let me note that this Introduction focuses upon the incommensurabil-
ity of options or choices, and not the incommensurability of other items (such as values, goods, 
reasons, life-plans, and norms) that are sometimes described as 'incommensurable.' Although it 
remains an open philosophical question whether the incommensurability of values, goods, and so 
forth can always be reduced to the incommensurability of options-and I mean to take no position 
on that question here-I think it fair to say that the articles and comments in this Symposium are 
centrally concerned with options or choices rather than with other purportedly incommensurable 
items. 
Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 69-70 (1998). 
44 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incom-
mensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1185, 1185 (1998). 
The incommensurability thesis holds that people cannot always value options along a common 
metric that is normatively justified. Most advocates of this thesis argue that people can choose 
among options, but that the choice depends on qualitative differences between options that cannot 
be reduced to vectors on a single dimension of evaluation. 
Id. (footnote omitted). The tenor of Posner's definition makes clear the threat that incommensurability, 
as construed in the Symposium and generally, represents for consequentialist analyses such as positive 
economics. If actors cannot make choices by reference to some quantification that may "be reduced to 
vectors on a single dimension of evaluation," it would be difficult to conclude that rational choices pro-
duce aggregate welfare gains. Incommensurability would even undermine the basis of self-interested 
action, a tenet of microeconomic theory and the economic analysis of law. If I cannot make choices 
along a single dimension of evaluation, it is impossible to compare my choices with one another or to 
compare my choices with anyone else's choices. Richard Craswell, though unwilling to admit the sub-
stance of incommensurability, argued that incommensurability would not undermine welfare economics. 
See Craswell, supra note 37. 
Richard Warner also defined incommensurability in terms that confirm Adler's formulation: "Rea-
sons are incommensurable when, and only when, they cannot be compared as better, worse, or equally 
good." Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1287, 1287 (1998). So construed, incommensurability is an insurmountable obstacle to 
public policy. "In forming public policy, we should select the policy supported by the best reasons." Id. 
Incommensurability makes it impossible to do that. 
Matthew Adler's principal contribution to the Symposium offered perhaps the most comprehensive 
definition of incommensurability: 
Incommensurability: A Practical Definition 
(I) Options are incommensurable, by a particular scaling procedure, for an agent, with respect to a 
particular normative criterion, if in light of that criterion the agent has (normative) reason not to 
use that scaling procedure in choosing between those options. 
(2) Options are incommensurable, simpliciter, for an agent, with respect to a particular normative 
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While it would be of limited utility to try to capture the substance of 
the incommensurability debate generally and as pursued in the Pennsyl-
vania Symposium, it is possible to present the Contract sense of the issue by 
referring to a point raised by Michael Trebilcock.45 He considered the en-
forceability of a woman's promise to become the mistress of a millionaire 
in return for the millionaire's paying the medical expenses of the woman's 
son. The woman would not otherwise be able to afford the care for her son. 
Trebilcock concluded that in resolving the Contract law question of whether 
the woman's promise should be enforced, "it seems difficult to avoid a 
moral base-line ... approach if we are to give effect to the moral intuition 
that most of us are likely to feel.'.46 In incommensurability terms, the Con-
tract dilemma is that we cannot make a choice-sexual favors for medical 
expenses-because doing so would require placing both sides of the "trans-
action" on the same "vector," to use Posner's term; or, if we prefer Adler's 
more elaborate rendition, the agent of decision (whether to enforce the 
promise), "has (normative) reason not to use [a particular scaling proce-
dure] in choosing between those options."47 The particular scaling proce-
dure could be money or some other form of consideration; in the case 
criterion, if in light of that criterion the agent has reason not to use any scaling procedure in choos-
ing between those options. 
(3) Options are incommensurable, simpliciter, for an agent, if in light of the totality of normative 
considerations the agent has reason not to use any scaling procedure in choosing between those 
options. 
Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1384 (1998). 
Frederick Schauer's comments in the Symposium were not limited to option incommensurability but 
extend to all forms of incommensurability: 
[T)he typical discussion of commensurability is an inquiry in moral ontology. That is, commensu-
rability is taken to be a property inhering in values, reasons, options, or norms, and much of the 
debate is about whether that property does or does not inhere in all values, reasons, options, or 
norms. Those who argue for commensurability maintain that all values, reasons, options, or norms 
are reducible to some common and thus comparable metric (perhaps dollars, perhaps some other 
medium of exchange, perhaps utils, or perhaps something else). . . . Relatedly, those who sub-
scribe to the somewhat different position known as comparability maintain that all values, reasons, 
options, or norms can be compared to each other, even if they cannot be reduced to a common 
metric. Naturally, those who argue for incommensurability or incomparability deny the phenome-
non of commensurability or comparability, and thus maintain that the members of some pairs or 
sets of reasons, values, options, or norms are irreducibly different. 
Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1215, 1215-16 (1998). 
45 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 8. 
46 See id. at 91. 
47 Adler, supra note 44, at 1384. We could as easily conform the second and third Adler incom-
mensurability alternative definitions to the Contract question, by saying that "with respect to a particular 
normative criterion [say, the inviolability of one's body, or, more generally, human dignity], the agent 
[and you can conceive of the Contract law as the agent] has reason not to use any scaling procedure in 
choosing between those options [enforce promise and child receives medical care, refuse to enforce 
promise and child dies but mother's bodily integrity is maintained]." !d. Similarly, with regard to the 
third definition, we may say that given the "totality of normative considerations," value of human life, 
inviolability of body, "the agent has reason not to use any scaling procedure in choosing between those 
options." !d. 
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Trebilcock posited,48 the woman would receive medical treatment for her 
son (on which we can fix a dollar value-the cost of the services) in ex-
change for sexual favors (on which we cannot, or will not, fix a dollar 
value). The reasons for our inability or reluctance to put a price tag on the 
consideration flowing from the woman to the millionaire are not important 
for the purposes of making the incommensurability point. It suffices to say 
that we can diagram the Contract law problem in incommensurability terms. 
In fact, we could probably find many examples of "bargains," not 
greatly different from Trebilcock's, in which Contract does concern itself 
with "notions of human dignity and self-respect."49 Depending upon how 
broadly we cast the "human dignity and self-respect" net, we might dis-
cover contractual settings in which a bargain implicates those notions but 
will be enforced by the court. For example, though a court might not en-
force a promisor's undertaking to perform sexual acts in exchange for 
money, courts do put a value on sexual services in awarding damages for 
loss of consortium.5° Contract law does honor bargains that seem to put a 
price on (or limit the price of) love in the enforcement of prenuptial agree-
ments. 
Incommensurability, to the extent that it implicates Contract, forces us 
to figure out whether making a choice between two alternatives is the prod-
uct of any real comparison "along a common metric"51 or instead a less ra-
tional (if not irrational) choice determined by what may be idiosyncratic 
valuations. We may not be able to compare apples and oranges by saying 
that one is more a fruit than the other; we are able, though, to decide to eat 
an apple rather than an orange. 
The idea that law is compromised by the inability of even similarly 
situated transactors to make choices because the alternatives presented are 
incommensurable triggers a subtly different but profoundly more discon-
certing conclusion. According to incommensurability theory, rational 
choice is subject to the vicissitudes of substantially different scaling proc-
esses. We cannot put a price on the sacrifice of "human dignity and self-
respect." And that remains true notwithstanding the fact that we do just that 
type of price fixing all of the time. The fact that we do it does not mean 
that doing so is the product of rational choice. 
We can take issue with the conclusion that choices are incommensur-
able in the way posited by those who are preoccupied with incommensura-
bility of choice. But we cannot fault the conclusion that 
incommensurability, to the extent it exists, may undermine the function of 
48 Trebilcock actually drew the hypothetical from ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 10, 225, 229 
(1987). 
49 TREBILCOCK, supra note 8, at 91. 
50 Though this arises in the context ofTort, the bargain valued is the bargain between the direct tort 
victim and the party whose right of consortium is compromised by the tortfeasor. 
51 Posner, supra note 44, at 1185. 
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the law. So if there is a substantial incommensurability problem in Con-
tract, as Contract is currently conceived, there is a fundamental problem 
with Contract. A reconception of Contract could place the determinants of 
promise enforcement on a common vector by emphasizing the extent of en-
forcement by reference to the relation among the elements of bargain. In 
that way, Contract could capture the dynamic relation among those ele-
ments in the same way that Tort balances the determinants of negligence li-
ability. 
Tort liability is often articulated using Judge Learned Hand's negli-
gence formula: B < PL.52 This reduction to formula guides application of 
the law of many nonconsensual relations in terms that cut across different 
categories of Tort liability. 53 But it would be incorrect to conclude that Tort 
is necessarily any more of a science than is Contract. All we can conclude 
with confidence is that, so far, Contract liability has not been expressed in 
the same succinct formulaic terms as has Tort. 54 
C. "New Math" 
This subpart reveals the decisional dynamic in three Contract contexts, 
promissory estoppel, consequential damages, and unconscionability, to 
demonstrate analytical formulae that provide the means to overcome the 
static conceptions that would obscure the promise enforcement calculus. It 
is not coincidence that the dynamic interrelations resolve themselves, ulti-
mately, into matters of degrees of promise enforcement. They do so by 
overcoming the incommensurability that otherwise results from misunder-
standing the constituents of Contract. 
52 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and, since, if she does, 
she becomes a menace to those about her, the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to pro-
vide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will 
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precau-
tions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into reliefto state it in algebraic terms: if the probabil-
ity be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P; i.e., whether B is less than PL. 
!d. Cardozo captured the same idea of interrelation among rational units in legal analysis with his fa-
mous postulate from Palsgraf "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed and 
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
53 In addition to negligence, the defect calculus in the strict products liability law draws on Hand-
like balancing. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OFPRODUCfS LIABILITY§ 2 cmt. f(1998). 
s4 But Goetz and Scott have offered a formula to determine the Contract damages calculus: 
Let p be the promisor's reasonable, subjective assessment of the probability that he will perform a 
promise under an existing legal rule calling for damages ofD in the event of breach. For the darn-
age rule to deter all promises with net social costs and encourage those with net benefits, the 
amount of damages awarded must satisfY the following equation: 
(1-p)D=(1-p)R-pB 
where Rand B are the values of detrimental and beneficial reliances, respectively. 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 4, at 1281. 
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Recognize that it is the terminology of Contract that gives rise to in-
commensurability (frustrating the "repeatability" of Contract analysis) by 
positing the determinative indicia in terms that obscure their operation on a 
common metric. The language of Contract defies the type of balancing we 
see in Hand's Tort law formula. The same variables afforded the same 
valuations by different subjects assume different object shapes. Even if we 
attribute the same unit values to an element of Contract by agreeing, for in-
stance, that where there is an "agreement to exchange" there is a bargain, 
persistent glitches will still undermine the type of consensus that would re-
duce subject-object dissonance. To decide whether there has been an 
"agreement to exchange," two observers may each emphasize different 
elements of the actors' relative positions to support the conclusion that there 
was or was not a bargain and therefore an enforceable promise. 
The two hypothetical observers may share the same perception of the 
underlying facts, agreeing that A said this and B said that, but the observers 
may construe those facts differently, even though both constructions are 
within the terms of the elements' definitions. One observer might be com-
fortable finding a bargain if the subject matter of the contract were a fungi-
ble commodity but would not be willing to infer volition where the subject 
matter is a unique good. The other may feel constrained to find a bargain 
notwithstanding the subject matter of the communications between A and 
B. Alternatively, one may be more willing to find a contract the less the 
value in issue or the more certain the parties' expression of their intent. So 
long as the promise enforcement inquiry is limited to agreement, bargain, 
and consideration (as well as their constituents), it would be difficult for the 
two observers to place their different conclusions (choices)-for example, 
there was an acceptance or there was not an acceptance--on the same vec-
tor, one which reflects the range represented by the fungibility or unique-
ness of the subject matter, the value of the subject matter, or the more 
certain the expression of acceptance (for example, signature versus "point 
and click"). 
Were the elements of promise enforcement, though, appreciated in in-
terrelation so that we could acknowledge that a more casual form of accep-
tance supports the enforcement of some promises but not others, 55 and were 
the product of those interrelations amenable to expression as the extent of 
the parties' bargain, then we would have provided the common vector on 
which the observers' conclusions would be commensurable. That is not a 
concept foreign to the promise enforcement law. In fact, we accomplish 
55 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (3) ( 1981 ). That idea is acknowledged in Section 
211 of the Second Restatement, concerning so-called "standard terms": 
!d. 
Where [a] party has reason to believe that the party manifesting . . . assent [to a standardized 
agreement] would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not 
part of the agreement. 
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that type of dynamic analysis in at least three contexts under the current re-
gime: promissory estoppel, consequential damages, and unconscionability. 
I. Promissory Estoppel.-The promissory estoppel doctrine of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 provides for the enforcement 
of promises to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. 56 The apposite com-
ment explains that "the same factors which bear on whether any relief 
should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the remedy."57 
But the parallel between the damage measure in the promissory estoppel 
and consideration contexts is not perfect, as an illustration to the Restate-
ment provision reveals: 
A, who owns and operates a bakery, desires to go into the grocery business. 
He approaches B, a franchisor of supermarkets. B states to A that for $18,000 
B will establish A in a store. B also advises A to move to another town and 
buy a small grocery to gain experience. A does so. Later B advises A to sell 
the grocery, which A does, taking a capital loss and foregoing expected profits 
from the summer tourist trade. B also advises A to sell his bakery to raise 
capital for the supermarket franchise, saying "Everything is ready to go. Get 
your money together and we are set." A sells the bakery taking a capital loss 
on this sale as well. Still later, B tells A that considerably more than an 
$18,000 investment will be needed, and the negotiations between the parties 
collapse. At the point of collapse many details of the proposed agreement be-
tween the parties are unresolved. The assurances from B to A are promises on 
which B reasonably should have expected A to rely, and A is entitled to his ac-
tual losses on the sales of the bakery and grocery and for his moving and tem-
porary living expenses. Since the proposed agreement was never made, 
however, A is not entitled to lost profits from the sale of the grocery or to his 
expectation interest in the proposed franchise from B. 58 
Wholly apart from issues of whether a trier of fact could have found, if 
pressed to do so, the elements of a contract on those facts (Agreement+ 
Bargain+Consideration), the damages calculus of section 90 does not, by its 
terms, constrain A to recovery of reliance as opposed to expectation dam-
ages. The provision's only admonition with regard to damages is that they 
be "limited as justice requires." It is not at all clear that justice would nec-
essarily limit damages to an amount less than the benefit of A's bargain. 
And if the law would accommodate such a result under section 90, what is 
gained by approaching more clear consideration cases any differently? 
s6 Subsection (1) of§ 90 explains that 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires. 
!d. § 90(1) (emphasis added). 
s1 Id. § 90 cmt. d (emphasis added). 
ss Id. § 90 cmt. d, illus. 10. The illustration is based on Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 
267 (Wis. 1965). 
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In the last fifteen years or so, the fit between promissory estoppel and 
consideration-based theories of contract enforcement has been studied in 
some depth by commentators who have read essentially the same primary 
sources and reached diametrically different conclusions. The object of their 
study has been to discern what promissory estoppel adds to the law of 
promise enforcement: Do the courts enforce promises not supported by 
consideration on which the promisee has not relied? And, in cases in which 
courts have enforced promises not supported by consideration, have courts 
used a reliance rather than expectation measure of damages? 
In a striking article published in 1985/9 Daniel Farber and John 
Matheson proposed a new standard of promise enforcement, based on their 
reading of the cases,60 that would dispense altogether with the reliance re-
quirement and provide instead that a '~romise is enforceable when made in 
furtherance of an economic activity." So long as the promise made is in 
the furtherance of economic activity, the decisions, as Farber and Matheson 
read them, do not require that the promisee demonstrate actual reliance on 
the promise in order to enforce it. Further, they found the standard measure 
of recovery in cases of promissory estoppel is the expectation, benefit of the 
bargain, measure.62 Six years after Farber and Matheson, Edward Yorio 
and Steve Thel confirmed the earlier study's conclusions but emphasized to 
a greater extent the award of expectation damages in the promissory estop-
pel setting and the relationship between the quality or certainty of the prom-
ise and the extent of recovery.63 Yorio and Thel concluded that "courts 
respond to a policy of enforcing serious promises."64 
Two more recent contributions, though, question the conclusion that 
courts routinely dispense with the reliance requirement when enforcing 
promises on an estoppel basis. Robert Hillman read a sample of cases 
59 Farber & Matheson, supra note 28. 
60 The authors reported that they "collected every case in the past ten years citing section 90 of ei-
ther Restatement, and categorized the outcomes." !d. at 907. The accompanying footnote explained: 
Shepard's Citations, Restatement of the Law, Vol. 9, No. 3 (May 1985), identified 222 of such 
cases. These cases formed our primary data base. As an alternative measure of the popularity of 
promissory estoppel, we ran a LEXIS search (Genfed and States libraries) for cases since January 
1, 1980, that use the term "Promissory estoppel." We also reviewed the 540 cases identified by 
this search. Many of these cases, however, merely mentioned the doctrine without applying it. 
The numbers and percentages discussed in subsequent footnotes are all based on the primary data 
base of 222 cases. 
!d. at 907 n. l4. 
61 !d. at 930. 
62 
"[R]ecent cases are heavily weighted towards the award of full expectation damages." !d. at 909; 
see also id. at 909 n.24 ("The courts addressed the issue of the extent of recovery in 72 of the cases in 
our data group. In only one-sixth of those cases was recovery limited explicitly to reliance damages. 
Full expectation recovery was granted in the remaining five-sixths of the cases.") The authors also rec-
ognized and noted that the two measures, reliance and expectation, may produce the same dollar amount 
results. !d. 
58 
63 Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991). 
64 !d. at 129. 
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drawn from the years 1994-96 and found that reliance continues to matter, 
and indeed is determinative, in promissory estoppel cases. 65 Hillman also 
reread the cases upon which the earlier studies had relied and found that the 
authors of those studies had either misread the cases or not credited con-
structions of those decisions consistent with the recognition of a continuing 
role for reliance. Further, he found that the cases in his sample66 demon-
strated "the courts' flexibility in awarding either expectancy or reliance 
damages, thereby debunking the conclusion that courts favor expectancy 
damages in promissory estoppel cases."67 
Sidney DeLong reached a conclusion similar to Hillman's in his 1997 
contribution to the promissory estoppel debate.68 Arguing that enforcement 
of promises without a showing of reliance undermines commercial expecta-
tions and yields inefficient results, DeLong read the cases as supporting the 
conclusion that reliance remains an integral element of promise enforce-
ment on the basis of estoppel. He drew on a two-year sample of cases and 
concluded that "[c]ontemporary courts rigorously enforce section 90's re-
quirement that the promise induce actual reliance by the promisee."69 
Not a single one of the opinions surveyed by DeLong adopts Farber 
and Matheson's contention that actual reliance need not be proved so long 
as the promise is made seriously in furtherance of a commercial activity, or 
Yorio and Thel's contention that actual reliance is unnecessary if the prom-
ise is one that is likely to induce reliance. "Every single opinion that men-
tioned the matter instead affirmed the Restatement requirement that the 
plaintiff actually rely, some of them adding that the reliance must be 'sub-
stantial' as in the first Restatement version."70 
The lines are drawn and the means to reconcile the commentators' di-
vergent reading of the case law is elusive.11 For present purposes, though, it 
65 Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582 (1998). 
I d. 
66 ld. at 582 n.l5. 
The list of cases was compiled from a search on LIDCIS of all cases within the time frame [July 
1, 1994 through June 30, 1996) that mentioned "promissory estoppel." The two-part search run in 
the MEGA library and MEGA file was: "DATE (AFT 7/01195 & BEF 7/01/96) AND Promissory 
Estoppel" and "DATE (6/30/94 & BEF 7/02195) AND Promissory Estoppel." The search yielded 
911 federal and state cases. From these, all cases that did not include a discussion of, or base a 
holding on, promissory estoppel were eliminated, yielding 362 cases that were then analyzed and 
coded. Cases reported by a LEXIS search of all cases mentioning either the first or second Re-
statement section 90 but not "promissory estoppel" yielded only four additional cases, only one of 
which was clearly decided on promissory estoppel grounds. 
67 Jd. at 588. 
68 Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory 
Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 943. 
69 Jd. at 948. 
70 Jd. at 984 (footnote omitted). 
71 It would seem that one explanation for the conflicting conclusions may be in the nature of there-
lationship between promise and reliance in the promissory estoppel setting. An expression is a promise, 
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is not necessary to impose harmony on the dissonance; there is something 
to be gleaned from the divergent studies' agreement with regard to the dam-
age measure. 
Fuller and Perdue recognized the amorphous nature of the expectation 
and reliance damage measures in their Reliance Interest article over half a 
century ago.72 The commentators lined up on both sides of the contempo-
rary promissor.;y estoppel issue, too, recognize the essential identity of the 
two measures. 3 More to the point here, though, is the commentators' con-
sensus regarding the degree or extent of a promise in terms of the extent of 
the enforcement of that promise. The more certain the proof of the promise, 
the more likely the court is to award the greater measure of recovery, gener-
ally the expectation measure: "[R]eliance damages may be awarded when 
expectation is difficult to prove or when the promise at issue is not suffi-
ciently definite to justit( a promissory remedy like specific performance or 
expectation damages."7 
That recognition of the essential identity of the expectation and reli-
ance measures supports the conclusion that the damages recoverable for 
breach may be, and in fact necessarily are, the product of a weighing of 
conflicting considerations, including considerations pertinent to the "seri-
to an extent, because it is the type of representation on which one may rely; more importantly, the fact 
that the addressee of the expression relies on the expression is some evidence that the expression was a 
promise. So there is a symbiotic relationship between the two. DeLong alluded to that without elabora-
tion: "It is not surprising to see the elements of specificity and reliance failing in the same case. An 
equivocal promise is less likely to induce actual reliance." /d. at 986 n.l37. So the fact that you have 
relied on what I said supports the conclusion that what I said was a promise and, conversely, the fact that 
I made a promise supports the conclusion that what you did after I made the promise was foreseeably in 
reasonable reliance on the promise. To that effect, see Yorio & The!, supra note 63, at 159-63, who ex-
plain that actual reliance is evidence of the existence of promise and foreseeability of reliance. Cf 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,276 (1986) ("{E]very promi-
sor should reasonably expect to induce reliance."); DeLong, supra note 68, at 952 ("Promisee reliance is 
implicit in the Restatement definition of 'promise,' which is couched in terms of the promisee's under-
taking."). 
/d. 
72 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 18, at 74. 
[W]here the reliance interest is conceived to embrace the loss of the opportunity to enter similar 
contracts with other persons, the reliance and expectation interests will have a tendency to ap-
proach one another, the precise degree of their correspondence depending upon the extent to which 
other opportunities of a similar nature were open to the plaintiff when he entered the contract on 
which suit is brought. 
73 See DeLong, supra note 68, at 979 ("[A] court that appears to be awarding expectation damages 
may be intending to award reliance and vice versa."); Farber & Matheson, supra note 28, at 909 n.24 
("Depending on how the expectation and reliance interests are conceptualized, the two measures may 
tend to produce the same results."); Hillman, supra note 65, at 601 ("[C]ourts often talk expectancy or 
reliance in situations where the remedies are identical."). 
74 Yorio & The!, supra note 63, at 149-50; see also id. at 162 ("What distinguishes enforcement 
from unenforceable promises is the quality of the commitment made by the promisor." (emphasis 
added)}; cf Farber & Matheson, supra note 28, at 933 ("Whether manifestations rise to the level of a 
promise depends on various factors, including the clarity of the manifestations, the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the manifestations."). 
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ousness" of the underlying promise and the certainty of the parties' under-
taking. Other commentators have noted courts' willingness to adapt the 
damage award to the relative bona fides of the contracting parties.75 
If we recognize that reliance matters in the promissory estoppel con-
text, as the later studies confmn,76 and we recognize that the extent of reli-
ance may fix the measure of damages in a successful promissory estoppel 
action, then it is clear that Contract now contemplates enforcement of a 
promise to an extent. It is, then, not inconsistent with Contract doctrine to 
contemplate enforcement of a promise by reference to all of the determi-
nants of the parties' bargain-the relation among the elements of Contract 
formation and the particular promise for which the nonbreaching party 
seeks enforcement. 7 Rather than fixing a promise/no promise boundary, a 
winner-take-all calculus, we may acknowledge in the damage measure an 
extent of the promise, and enforce a portion of the undertaking to the appro-
priate extent given the circumstances surrounding the promise. 
2. Consequential Damages.-Insofar as consequential damages law 
is in fact a matter of fmding the bargain and then enforcing it, awarding rea-
sonably foreseeable damages limited as ''justice so requires in order to 
avoid disproportionate compensation,"78 Contract law is deferring the extent 
of promise enforcement inquiry to the damage stage and then resolving it 
by reference to vague justice conceptions rather than by acknowledging that 
consequential damage doctrine is a restatement of the contract formation 
premises. Consider a relatively recent case-law elaboration of the conse-
quential damages rule that reveals the rule's affinity with formation doc-
trine. 
75 See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an In-
dependent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 472, 500 (breaching promisor's culpability may 
determine recovery of lost profits); Yorio & Thel, supra note 63, at 139 n.l77 (citing E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 2.19, at 100-01 (2d ed. 1990)) (expectation appropriate measure against 
breaching promisor who acts in bad faith). 
76 See DeLong, supra note 68; Hillman, supra note 65. 
77 Cf. James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 82 CAL. L. REv. 547, 582-84 (analyzing cases of"gra-
tuitous agency" and finding that relief in such cases "can be explained by a simpler principle than detri-
mental reliance: that promises that entail little cost to oneself are binding"). 
78 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: 
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee 
as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. 
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach 
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or 
(I)) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the 
party in breach had reason to know. 
(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by 
allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circum-
stances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation. 
REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351 (1981); see a/so U.C.C. § 2-715 (2000). 
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In Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.,79 a ship charterer, Hyman-
Michaels, entered into a contract with the owners of the Pandora to charter 
that ship. Payments pursuant to the charter contract were accomplished by 
Hyman-Michaels's causing its bank, Continental Illinois, to debit the Hy-
man-Michaels account and send a telex to Continental's London office for 
retransmission to Swiss Bank, which would then deposit the amount 
"wired" into the account of the Pandora's owner. When one of the periodic 
payments came due, Hyman-Michaels followed its normal procedure. Con-
tinental, in turn, sent a telex to its London correspondent, and that bank sent 
a telex to Swiss bank, which did not timely credit the account of the Pan-
dora's owner, who terminated the charter as was the owner's right upon not 
having received the payment when due. 
Hyman-Michaels brought an action against Swiss Bank, alleging that 
its failure to effect the wire transfer caused Hyman-Michaels to lose an ad-
vantageous contract. Charter prices had risen and it would not be possible 
for Hyman-Michaels to get as good a deal on the same or a comparable ves-
sel. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an opin-
ion written by Judge Posner, analyzed the facts in terms of Contract, 
notwithstanding the lack of a written agreement between Hyman-Michaels 
and Swiss Bank. The court relied on the reasoning in Hadley v. Baxen-
dale80 and Siegel v. Western Union Tel. Co.81 At issue was the existence 
and nature of Swiss Bank's promise to Hyman-Michaels, though Judge 
Posner used the term "undertaking." 
If we were to apply a simple bargain analysis, it would be difficult, 
strictly speaking, to find the stuff of bargain. There was no face-to-face 
meetin~ and no haggling over price (Hyman-Michaels paid no fee to Swiss 
Bank). Indeed, it is difficult to see what direct benefit Swiss Bank would 
have received from Hyman-Michaels on account of the transfer. Nonethe-
less, the court invoked Contract principles from Hadley and Siegel to de-
termine the existence and extent of Swiss Bank's liability to Hyman-
Michaels. And Siegel confirmed the rule of Hadley insofar as the defendant 
was no more aware of the potential loss to the plaintiff than the defendant in 
Hadley had been. 
The Evra court created the bargain and then found that there had been 
no breach of it. Because Hyman-Michaels had been "imprudent" in its ef-
forts to effect the payment to the Pandora's owner, Swiss Bank was not li-
able for its failure to credit the owner's account: 
79 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982). 
80 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley was described by the Seventh Circuit as "the leading common 
Jaw case on liability for consequential damages caused by failure or delay in carrying out a commercial 
undertaking." Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 955. 
81 37 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (action against telegraph company for misdirection of money 
order that caused plaintiff pecuniary Joss). 
82 Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 955. 
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Hyman-Michaels is a sophisticated enterprise. It knew or should have known 
that even the Swiss are not infallible; that messages sometimes get lost or de-
layed in transit among three banks, two of them located 5000 miles apart, even 
when all the banks are using reasonable care; and that therefore it should take 
its own precautions against the consequences-best known to itself-of a mis-
hap that might not be due to anyone's negligence. 83 
Recognize that those observations, pertinent though they may be to the ul-
timate liability determination, have little to do with the bargain between 
Swiss Bank and Hyman-Michaels. 
The point here is not that the Seventh Circuit did or did not reach the 
correct conclusion. Focus instead on the way that the conclusion flows 
from conceptions of bargain that do not seem to be contemplated by the 
likes of "agreement to exchange." Offer, acceptance, and consideration are 
inapposite. It is the amount of money at stake (on both sides of the deal) 
the relative sophistication of the parties (a large corporation and interna-
tional bank), and the physical relation of the parties (separated by 5000 
miles), that determined the contours of the bargain. 
The court also noted a parallel between its decision, construing Hadley, 
and the Tort law generally: "The amount of care that a person ought to take 
is a function of the probability and magnitude of the harm that may occur if 
he does not take care."84 Of course, in support of that conclusion Judge 
Posner cited Carroll Towing,85 the source of the Hand Formula. The Evra 
opinion also invoked Palsgraf:86 
These were circumstances too remote from Swiss Bank's practical range of 
knowledge to have affected its decisions as to who should man the telex ma-
chines in the foreign department or whether it should install more machines in 
the cable department, any more than the falling of a platform scale because a 
conductor jostled a passenger who was carrying fireworks was a prospect that 
could have influenced the amount of care taken by the Long Island Railroad. 87 
Judge Posner found the stuff of Contract bargain in Tort duty, or at least 
appreciated the affinity (though it is not necessary to equate the two, and I 
do not posit that equation). This review of Evra reveals the decision's fo-
cus on the interrelation of factors pertinent to liability-discovery of a (lim-
ited) bargain and enforcement of its terms. It does not suggest that all of 
the Contract bargain analysis resolves into a matter of Tort duty, but it is no 
great leap to appreciate that Judge Posner found something in the Hand 
Formula applicable to the Contract question. 
3. Unconscionability.-Simiiarly, the unconscionability rule of the 
83 /d. at 957. 
84 /d. at 958. 
85 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
86 Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see supra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
87 Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 958 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928)). 
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Contracts restatement88 provides the reviewing court a means to reformulate 
the bargain of the parties on account of some deficiency in the bargaining 
process: Once a court finds that a portion of a contract is unconscionable, 
the court may adjust the offensive term in a way that will avoid an uncon-
scionable result. The object of the provision is to avoid the consequences 
of an ostensible bargain when the facts reveal that the apparent mutual as-
sent was insubstantial-that the agreement complied with the forms of Con-
tract but did not support the inference of volition that is the basis of promise 
enforcement. 
That process, finding that an exchange of promises gave rise to a con-
tract but limiting enforcement of the constituent promises, is consistent with 
the reconception of Contract urged here, and demonstrates the law's capac-
ity to make distinctions that will determine the extent to which a particular 
promise may be enforceable. If a contract contains a provision pursuant to 
which one of the parties surrenders her right to bring an action on the con-
tract in court and instead requires that disputes be submitted to arbitration, 
the court reviewing that contract could invalidate the arbitration clause by 
finding it unconscionable. 
That is no different in kind from a court's finding that, in light of the fit 
among the elements of Contract formation, the damages to which one party 
would be entitled upon the other's breach is to be determined by reference 
to the extent to which we may be certain of our inference of volition. This 
does not reproduce the unconscionability calculus: because the object here 
is not to determine which terms of the contract are enforceable or whether 
the contract is enforceable at all. Instead, this provides the means to explain 
decisions in which the courts find that the parties did not enter into a con-
tract ab initio because there was no bargain. Once a court decides that the 
relationship between the parties was not the product of contract, then the 
court will either leave the complaining party without a remedy or fix a 
measure of damages by reference to some measure other than the benefit of 
the bargain, the expectation measure. 
The reconception of Contract urged here also explains a court's will-
ingness to find enough of a bargain to enforce some promises but not others 
without finding the unconscientious overreaching that is the basis of uncon-
scionability. Consider the opinion of Judge Easterbrook in a decision that 
impacts the evolving law of contract formation: Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.89 
Hill is a case about bargain, and it is also a case that treats the interre-
lation among offer, acceptance, and bargain. The facts presented fore-
88 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) provides: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
!d.§ 208; see also U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2000). 
89 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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shadow issues that will arise as classical conceptions of offer, acceptance, 
and bargain evolve. Judge Easterbrook's generic presentation of the facts 
and issue captured the transactional dynamic: 
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a credit card 
number. Presently a box arrives, containing the computer and a list of terms, 
said to govern unless the customer returns the computer within 30 days. Are 
these terms effective as the parties' contract, or is the contract term-free be-
cause the order-taker did not read any terms over the phone and elicit the cus-
tomer's assent?90 
The case would be governed by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
but that statute provides for the application of common-law contract rules 
unless "displaced" by Code provision.91 
The buyer, the Hills, tried to avoid the operation of the arbitration 
clause that was included among the terms packaged with the computer but 
not disclosed in the course of the telephone conversation during which the 
Hills ordered the computer. The terms included with the computer pro-
vided that the buyer would be bound to those terms if they retained the 
computer for thirty days. The Hills did so. 
The arbitration clause was not the product of bargain, in the traditional 
or at least colloquial sense, insofar as it was not mentioned at the time the 
parties traded offer and acceptance. In fact, the telephone order-taker did 
not even expressly mention that contract terms would be shipped with the 
goods. The most that the court could say was that "the Hills knew before 
they ordered the computer that the carton would include some important 
terms."92 Gateway advertisements impart that information. Easterbrook 
described what bargain has become: 
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transporta-
tion, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considerations support 
allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers 
cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up 
sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct sales operations such 
as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking the 
buyer's credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than 
enlighten many potential buyers. . . . Competent adults are bound by such 
90 !d. at 1148. The facts of the case are a bit richer than that brief rendition, but Easterbrook's 
statement of them in terms of the Contract issue accommodates the application of his analysis to a 
broader array of more technologically sophisticated contracting forms. 
91 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2000) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the princi-
ples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal 
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other validating 
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.") 
While it is not so clear that Section 2-207 of the Code is wholly inapposite on the Hill facts, the 
court treated the Contracts issue as a matter of common law and thereby said something about the com-
mon law bargain concept. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50. 
92 !d. at 1150. 
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documents, read or unread. 93 
Bargain may arise from the receipt of unread forms even where there 
was no opportunity to read them before receipt. While that idea is not 
without precedent in Contract law,94 it does present the bargain concept in 
stark relief. 
As the survey in this Part has disclosed, when we make the best sense 
of Contract, notwithstanding the impediments created by the language of 
Contract, we do so by distilling transactional patterns through the Contract 
terminology. The next Part describes the advantages of imposing a natural-
istic perspective on the reconception of Contract. 
III. SCIENCE AS ANALOGY OR CONTRACT AS SCIENCE 
To drop the quotation marks from "science," in the sense of a Contract 
"science," it is necessary to appreciate the way the suggestion of empirical 
integrity is intended. Contract is not likely to resolve itself ultimately into 
something with the elegance of E=mc2, but the reason for that may have 
nothing to do with the complexity of Contract or relative simplicity of rela-
tivity. It is not difficult to resolve Contract, or Contract principles, into rep-
resentations of equivalence, and commentators have done just that.95 It is 
not clear, however, that such formulae advance the inquiry the same way 
they would if the object of the formulae were to describe a quantitative rela-
tionship. 
This Part of the Article delineates the object of scientific inquiry in 
terms that suggest Contract analysis parallels by identifying the constituents 
of science revealed in studies of scientific revolution. That may only be ac-
complished, however, after developing an understanding of such a Contract 
science as a phase of naturalism in jurisprudence. The presentation of those 
premises confirms the contribution of that perspective to the development 
of a frame of reference that will more accurately order the relationship 
among the elements of Contract and provides the basis for an appreciation 
of Contract's response to crisis. 
A. Naturalism and Contract Theory 
Perhaps the best recent exposition of naturalism in jurisprudence is 
provided by Brian Leiter's investi~ation into the "naturalized jurispru-
dence" of American Legal Realism. 6 He discovered common ground be-
93 I d. at 1149 (emphasis added). 
94 Perhaps, the best example of its application is Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
but that provision does not actually enforce terms which the parties in fact had no opportunity to read. 
95 See supra note 54. 
96 See Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW EsSAYS 
IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) [hereinafter Leiter, Naturalism]; Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REv. 267 (1997) [hereinafter Leiter, 
Rethinking]. 
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tween the legal realism of Karl Llewellyn,97 Jerome Frank,98 Underhill 
Moore,99 Herman Oliphant/00 and Leon Green101 and the naturalistic phi-
losophy of W.V. Quine.102 It is, occasionally, unclear whether Leiter is 
merely drawing an analogy or concluding that legal realism is naturalized 
jurisprudence. Though he used the term "analogy" in the body of his Re-
thinking piece, 103 his ultimate conclusion is that "the Realists were not bad 
legal philosophers, but rather prescient ones, philosophical naturalists be-
fore their time."104 It is not necessary to resolve that tension. What matters 
for the instant study is the relationship between the scientific predisposition 
(and what that is) and an epistemology of the cooperation among the con-
stituents that determine the operation of Contract law. 
First we must identify the character of science that supports its com-
parison with legal analysis. Then it will be worthwhile to delineate the 
qualities of scientific inquiry that make it both inevitable and, ultimately, 
inevitably incomplete. The fact that a Contract science will not yield faun-
97 E.g., K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH {1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence-the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Real-
ism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
98 E.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND {1930); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? 
80 U. PA. L. REv. 17 (1931). Leiter noted the "Frankification" of realism: "the now dominant tendency 
to treat Jerome Frank's particular interpretation of the Core Claim as identical to Realism." Leiter, Re-
thinking, supra note 96, at 269. Leiter concluded that the Core Claim of realism "is that judges reach 
decisions based on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the basis of the 
applicable rules of law." ld. at 275. The Frank corollary, if you will, focuses on the personality of the 
judge in the adjudicatory process: "[T]he Stimuli affecting the judge [multiplied by] the Personality of 
the judge [equals] Decisions." Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class 
Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233,242 (1931). 
99 E.g., Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Con-
trol, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Ap-
plied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts, 40 YALE L.J. 1219 (1931). 
100 Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928). 
101 Brian Leiter cited Leon Green's casebook, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES {1931), as an 
exemplar of teaching materials composed in the realist tradition, organized "not by typical doctrinal 
categories ... but rather by the situation types in which harms occur." Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96, 
at283 n.77. 
102 See, e.g., W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER 
EsSAYS 69 (1969). Leiter also noted that several other philosophers, including Jerry Fodor, David Arm-
strong, David Lewis, Jaegwon Kim, and Alvin Golman, have contributed to the naturalism development: 
"[I]ndeed, it would not be wrong to say that it is the distinctive development in philosophy over the last 
thirty years." Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96, at 286-87. 
103 See Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96, at 294-95 ("We can find, I shall argue, analogues of both 
steps [of Quine's argument for Replacement Naturalism] in the Realists' approach to the theory of adju-
dication."). 
The analogy, simply put, is this: just as philosophic pragmatists [such as Quine] hold that it is a 
criterion of acceptability for particular epistemic norms that they work for us as humans-e.g., by 
helping us predict sensory experience-so, too, it is a criterion of acceptability for a theory of ad-
judication for the Realists that it work for lawyers. 
ld. at309. 
104 Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96, at 315. 
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dational imperatives in no way diminishes the application of naturalism to 
determinants of why promises bind. Elaboration on those analyses support 
the application of Leiter's understanding of the forms of naturalism to the 
science of Contract in terms that suggest at least analogy between theories 
of scientific revolution and the evolution of Contract doctrine (and theory). 
I. Science Described.-To conclude that a subject matter is a sci-
ence is to say something about the mode of inquiry that determines the ac-
cumulation of knowledge about that subject matter. The term "science" 
denotes a relationship between phenomena and theory, and connotes a rigor 
of methodology supported by measurable verifiability. 105 Scientific conclu-
sions are susceptible of proof, by which we need mean no more than repro-
duction. In law that reproduction takes the form of principles or rules, 
statutory or common law. So appreciated, science is not a qualitatively dif-
ferent rational experience; instead, it is a quantitatively superior rational ex-
perience. Perhaps it is a form of hubris to assert a science of Contract, in 
the first instance, or maybe the reference need contemplate no more than an 
aspirational standard.106 
Larry Laudan recognized that science is a label properly affixed to a 
105 Edward Wilson offered a catalog of the features of science that distinguish it from "pseudo-
science": 
[F]irst, repeatability: The same phenomenon is sought again, preferably by independent investiga-
tion, and the interpretation given to it is confirmed or discarded by means of novel analysis and 
explanation. Second, economy: Scientists attempt to abstract information into the form that is both 
simplest and aesthetically most pleasing-the combination called elegance-while yielding the 
largest amount of information with the least amount of effort. Third, mensuration: If something 
can be properly measured, using universally accepted scales, generalizations about it are rendered 
unambiguous. Fourth, heuristics: The best science stimulates further discovery, often in unpre-
dictable new directions; and the new knowledge provides an additional test of the original princi-
ples that led to its discovery. Fifth and finally, consilience: The explanations of different 
phenomena most likely to survive are those than can be connected and proved consistent with one 
another. 
WILSON, supra note 5, at 53. 
106 The natural sciences have been offered as the "best extant example" of the nature of knowledge. 
LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARDS A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC GROWTH I 
(1977). Construed as a judgment on the epistemological integrity of the natural sciences, that conclusion 
concurs with the appraisal of Thomas Kuhn, whose work on scientific revolution has touched many dis-
ciplines, including law. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 
1996). Indeed, every legal commentator who has referred to "paradigmatic shift" or some close variant 
thereof probably owes an unacknowledged (and even unrealized) debt to Professor Kuhn, whose work 
endeavors to describe what it means for a paradigm to shift in the natural sciences, at least. See, e.g., 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 751 (1982) 
(drawing on the Kuhnian sense of paradigm). Kuhn observed, in terms that distinguish scientific in-
quiry, that 
The scientist must ... be concerned to understand the world and to extend the precision and scope 
with which it has been ordered. That commitment must, in turn, lead him to scrutinize . .. some 
aspect of nature in great empirical detail. And, if that scrutiny displays pockets of apparent disor-
der, then these must challenge him to a new refinement of his observational techniques or to a fur-
ther articulation of his theories. 
KUHN, supra, at 42 (emphasis added). 
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certain degree of epistemological integrity when he posited the distinction 
between empirical and conceptual problems. 107 That is consistent with the 
structure of the continuum urged above: "Science" is a label that may be 
affixed at that point at which a conclusion may be verifiably stated in em-
pirical terms. Kuhn's characterization, too, is consistent with the view of 
science asserted so far in this Part because a more discrete area of inquiry, 
one constrained by certain epistemic borders that exclude inapposite noise, 
is more likely to realize the level of repeatability we associate with a sci-
ence. 
In comparing the natural and social sciences, Laudan has elaborated on 
the characteristics distinguishing natural science: 
It is frequently claimed that the sciences alone are progressive and cumulative, 
while other areas of inquiry exhibit changes of fashion and style which cannot 
be meaningfully described as progressive. . . . [I]t is sometimes said that the 
sciences can discover when their assumptions are wrong, but the humanistic 
disciplines cannot; it is frequently alleged that the sciences are "self-
corrective," but that the nonsciences lack that crucial characteristic. 108 
He was not ultimately convinced by those bases of distinction, 109 and of-
fered an alternative: "What has stood in the way of recognition of the cog-
nitive parity of the sciences and the nonsciences has been a simplistic 
identification of (scientific) rationality with experimental control and quan-
titative precision."110 
Focus on "experimental control and quantitative precision," even if 
that focus is incomplete, is but part and parcel of a conception of science as 
demarking a constrained field of intellectual inquiry, one in which the two 
qualities inhere. First, there are a limited number of variables; when the 
variables became too great in number, the field ceases to be a science. Sec-
ond, the variables are susceptible of sufficiently precise formulation such 
that they achieve the scientific level of repeatability, which is itself not a 
fixed point but instead a level contingent upon the capacity of the perceiv-
ers' consensus111 regarding the subject-object relation. 112 The extent to 
!d. 
107 LAUDAN, supra note 106, at 48. 
108 Id. at 191 (footnote omitted). 
109 /d. 
Disciplines like metaphysics, theology, even literary criticism exhibit all the features we require 
for making rationale appraisals of the relative merits of competing ideologies within them. The 
nonsciences, every bit as much as the sciences, have empirical and conceptual problems; both can 
be shown to have made significant progress at certain stages of their historical evolution. 
110 /d. 
111 See supra note 34. 
112 
"Scientific progress would thus consist not in a 'drawing closer to the truth' in the sense of a 
progressive approximation of the true nature of things but rather in an ever-improving ability to identifY 
purely object-sided equivalence." HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 57. Hoyningen-Huene also 
provocatively asserted (in terms that may have some resonance with the consensus dilemma) that "(t]wo 
69 
HeinOnline -- 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 70 2001-2002
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
which it is appropriate for any field of intellectual inquiry to be character-
ized a science is deRendent upon those two characteristics and the relation-
ship between them. 13 
That conclusion, then, depicts science as a label affixed to an intellec-
tual pursuit at a certain point, a matter of degree. In the case of athletic 
prowess (by way of illustration), the point is determined by the combination 
of the practitioner's (theorist's) physical, perceptual, and intellectual acuity. 
In purely intellectual pursuits, the point is determined by the practitioners' 
(or community's) rational perceptions. So the conclusion that something is 
a science is no more than the conclusion that the subject-sided perception in 
fact reflects accurately the object-sided phenomena to the extent that there-
lationship between subject and object is repeatable (and in that sense ration-
ally accessible) to the community subjecting that relation to analysis. 114 
Understood as describing a relation among variables in terms of per-
ceptual acuity rather than an intellectual endeavor qualitatively distinct 
from other modes of intellectual activity (perhaps, what we might call the 
arts), a sense of Contract science emerges. We will have formulated a Con-
tract science when we depict the study of exchange relations in terms that 
conceive of such relations as the product of a limited number of variables 
susceptible to sufficiently precise formulation. The object of conceiving of 
Contract as science is to then support the imposition of theories of the vari-
ables' interrelation on recurring patterns of coordinated behavior. Prelimi-
narily, though, the sections that follow must complete the foregoing 
description of science in terms that have currency in the law. 
2. Science as Inevitable.-Randy Barnett drew a distinction between 
two approaches to jurisprudence, particularly in the Contracts context: 115 He 
concluded that the legal realists' approach is to list the factors determinative 
of a particular result, while those whose approach Barnett described as "le-
gal theory" endeavor to describe the fundamental principles that animate the 
stimulus situations rather count as equivalent [or, you could read, measurably verifiable] if they agree in 
those features which, for biological reasons, are perceptually efficacious, even if they differ in their per-
ceptually inert aspects." Id. 
113 To put that idea succinctly, albeit roughly, for Ted Williams and Tony Gwynn there is a science 
of hitting a baseball thrown upwards of ninety miles an hour; for the casual fan (and, indeed, many pro-
fessional athletes), hitting is not a science. 
114 That is not to admit, though, that every relation that may be captured in empirical terms certainly 
confirms scientific analysis. The fact that there is a "Hand Formula" describing portions of the law of 
nonconsensual relations is not sufficient to conclude there is a "Tort science." There may be, but B<PL 
is probably more of a means to focus inquiry than certain proof of that level of subject-object coinci-
dence measurable verifiability that confirms science. The elements of the formula may lack the fixed 
characteristics, the sufficiently precise formulation that accommodates science. The formula does suc-
ceed as a shorthand abbreviation of the relation among variables (or, at least, a plausible relation among 
variables) even if it does not have all ofthe descriptive or predictive qualities associated with science. 
115 See Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1413 (1999) (review-
ing ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997)). 
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coordination of the factors relevant to the resolution of a controversy.116 
Ultimately, the dichotomy Barnett posits is false, or at least incomplete,117 
but his inquiry does confirm the conclusion that the object of Contracts the-
ory scholarship is to get to the bottom of the consensual relations question: 
We inevitably ask why promises bind. 
The literature is rich with commentators offering fundamental theories 
of Contract. In a recent contribution, Richard Craswell surveyed a large 
sample of modern Contract theory in the course of his critique of the Fuller 
and Perdue Reliance Interest article.118 Craswell described Contract theory 
proceeding from microeconomics, 119 contractarian moral philosophy, 120 re-
tributive and expressive theories of remedies, 121 distributional theories of 
116 Id. at 1414. 
117 See Alces, supra note 11, at 154-56. 
118 Craswell, supra note 35, at 106-36. 
119 Craswell cited Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contacts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989), and Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1994), as examples of scholarship written from a microeconomic 
perspective that focuses on the incentives created by Contract remedial schemes. Craswell, supra note 
30, at 107 n.30. Though there are many other examples of such consequentialist theory, two articles by 
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott perhaps best capture the tenor of the Jaw and economics perspective in-
sofar as it supports a fundamental theory of Contract. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Miti-
gation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983); 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 4. The foundation of positive economic theory is Jeremy Bentham's "princi-
ple of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and [Bentham] sought to make himself the Newton 
of the legal and moral world by establishing the principles of an experimental science governing that 
sphere, much as Newton had formulated the fundamental laws of the physical world." LORD LLOYD OF 
HAMSTED & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUcriON TO JURISPRUDENCE 206 (6th ed. 1994). 
12° Craswell described the Contractualists as subscribing to "the premise that just or moral rules 
consist of those rules to which all parties could agree under some sort of ideal circumstances." 
Craswell, supra note 35, at 111. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) ("veil of ignorance"). 
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998) was formulated by Craswell as asking "what a 
reasonable moral agent could consent to, or what rules could be justified even to those who find them-
selves disadvantaged by the rule in any particular instance." Craswell, supra note 35, at 112 (emphases 
in original). See also Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 199 (1990) 
(considering circumstances under which promises ought to bind). 
121 The authorities cited by Craswell in support of the retributive and expressive goals perspectives 
in the Contracts damages literature include William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Con-
tracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999); Steven B. Katz, The California Tort of Bad Faith Breach, the Dissent 
in Seaman's v. Standard Oil, and the Role of Punitive Damages in Contract Doctrine, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 509 (1987); Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach 
of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 733 (1982). Craswell, supra note 35, at 116 n.65. Craswell cited 
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, A Case for Loss-Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 573 (1983) (focusing on excused performance); 
Robert E. Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest," 61 CORNELL L. REV. 704 (1982) (reliance based 
damage calculus); Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticabil-
ity, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985); W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19 (1981), in sup-
port of the observation that "some scholars have argued that a breacher's liability should be reduced in 
cases where the nonbreacher was at least partially at fault." Craswell, supra note 35, at 117 n.67; see 
also James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 82 CAL. L. REV. 547 (1995) (imposition of Aristotelian theory 
to achieve ·~ustice"). 
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remedies, 122 corrective justice models, 123 and ideological theories consonant 
with capitalism 124 or, alternatively, socialism. 125 Comprehensive review of 
those perspectives is not necessary here; suffice it to say that the object of 
each is to posit the foundation of Contract. What the catalog discloses is an 
attraction to the unique normative interest that the commentator urges the 
law of consensual relations should vindicate. 
Even those, like Craswell, 126 who eschew reliance on a single animat-
ing theory of Contract conclude that the phases of Contract may be deline-
ated by context, the suggestion being that when the cases are put in their 
correct categories, generalization is possible, and within those categories 
fundamental values are (or may be made) manifest. Michael Trebilcock, in 
his comprehensive survey of the contexts in which freedom of contract 
principles operate (and, occasionally, fail to operate),127 carefully cataloged 
the transactional variables that should determine the enforceability of a 
promise when one party demurs. Trebilcock's perspective is informed by 
positive economics, and so he resolved difficult cases in microeconomic 
terms. 128 
122 Craswell cited most prominently as an exemplar of this perspective Duncan Kennedy, Distribu-
tive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms 
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982). Craswell, supra note 35, at 119 n.73. 
123 Fuller and Perdue's reliance on Aristotelian conceptions of distributive justice provide the illus-
tration of this fundamental theory of Contract. Craswell, supra note 35, at 122-28. It is not clear that 
Fuller and Perdue pursue that line of analysis and argument in any substantial way, see Alces, supra 
note 11, at 162, but for present purposes it suffices to note that the distributional justice perspective pro-
vides the type of foundational theory of Contract that confirms the inevitability of the scientific inquiry 
in determining why promises (should) bind. For the argument that Fuller and Perdue advocate a dis-
tributive perspective in the Reliance Interest article, see Todd D. Rakoff, Fuller and Perdue's The Reli-
ance Interest as a Work of Legal Scholarship, 1991WIS. L. REV. 203. 
124 Craswell did not specifically attribute a capitalist value system to any particular Contracts theo-
rist's assertion of a fundamental basis of Contract. He suggested the coincidence between the award of 
expectation damages and capitalistic free market conceptions: 
The only other theory that has even been suggested by modern scholars is one that attaches ideo-
logical significance to the expectation and reliance remedies. Specifically, this theory sees expec-
tation damages as the remedy most appropriate to individualism, capitalism and the free market; 
while reliance and restitution damages are seen as better suited to collective ideologies such as so-
cialism or communitariansism. 
Craswell, supra note 35, at 128-29. Craswell did acknowledge that Patrick Atiyah relied on individual-
ism and free market principles to support both the primacy of reliance damages and the enforceability of 
the fully executory promise where neither party has relied on the other's promise. Craswell, supra note 
35, at 134 (citing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW, 202-12 (1981)). 
125 Craswell concluded that the approaches of Duncan Kennedy and Charles Fried formulate a so-
cialist foundation of Contract. Craswell, supra note 35, at 131-33 (citing Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); FRIED, supra note 12). 
126 See supra note 11. 
127 TREBILCOCK, supra note 8. 
128 Trebilcock discusses "The Choice of Optimal Legal Framework for Regulating Surrogacy Con-
tracts": 
Commissioning parents are now bearing a risk that they would not bear in the absence of a right of 
repudiation and are likely to discount the surrogacy fee offered accordingly. They are also likely 
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The exposition in this section of the Article captures the tension be-
tween two competing ideas central to the assertion of a reconception of 
Contract. First, theorists who approach exchange relations law from a vari-
ety of perspectives each endeavor to identify the essential kernel of Con-
tract in their theory. The illustrations drawn from Craswell's survey 
confirm that conscientious conceptions of Contract share a common goal-
identification of the elemental key to why we enforce some promises and 
do not enforce others. Second, Contract may not be a unitary concept. That 
is, following the suggestion of Craswell, Farnsworth, and Trebilcock, we 
may conclude that one theory or another (or one group of theories or an-
other) may explain the resolution of some cases that we group under the 
Contract heading but be entirely impotent to guide resolution of other cases 
which we also describe as raising Contract issues. 
Contract reconceived should provide the means to demonstrate how 
doctrine can both accommodate different views of the foundation of prom-
ise enforcement and provide a nexus of reconciliation among the disparate 
contexts in which Contract operates. The conception of Contract as the sum 
of fixed parts obscures the variability of the constituent elements and the in-
terdependence among them. It is incomplete, at least, to say that "A+B+C= 
Promise Enforcement." And it is unlikely that we would be able to recon-
cile different views of Contract if we insist on the additive relation among 
its constituent parts. But if we recognize that "A in relation toBin relation 
to C equals the extent ofPromise Enforcement," then we have discovered a 
means to respond to the tension between the search for the unifying theory 
and the adaption of the fixed idea "Contract" to the variety of contexts in 
which promise enforcement is at stake. 
If we allow that different facts admit of different resolutions because 
they invoke different rational and emotional responses, then we must ac-
commodate focus on those different reactions in order to establish the cate-
gories that in fact accommodate the better resolution of controversies. The 
object of categories, and, in tum, of applying a particular principle and rule 
matrix to phenomena within the same category, is to avoid controversy 
to re-apportion payments from the pre-delivery period to the delivery juncture to induce waivers of 
the right of repudiation; as the Coase theorem in law and economics would predict, in many con-
texts parties will attempt to bargain around constraints the legal system imposes on them. How-
ever, making the two sides of the exchange more simultaneous arguably confronts the birth mother 
with a more reasoned choice. 
Id. at 54 (citing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). Interestingly, 
though, even when Trebilcock approached diverse Contract contexts as presenting value matrices suffi-
ciently distinguishable to require results not reconcilable by the application of mechanical Contract 
rules, he demonstrated that, at least in some settings, efficiency criteria cannot rationalize the resolution 
of difficult cases. When Trebilcock considered the hypothetical case of a single mother who "agrees" to 
become the mistress of a wealthy suitor in return for the suitor's payment of expensive medical care for 
her child, he was unable to find in the economics literature a source of decision that completely dis-
places a "moral base-line approach." Id. at 91. In fact, he acknowledged that in an array of recurring, 
albeit relatively marginal, contexts, "to enforce transactions ... is likely to violate basic notions of hu-
man dignity and self-respect." Id. 
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when it is possible to do so, by providing guidance to transactors, and to re-
solve controversy when it is not avoidable, by providing certain bases of 
resolution. It is not an overstatement to observe that the crises in Contract 
have been a product of trying to force square pegs into round holes. 129 A 
reconception of Contract that focuses on the interrelation of determinants to 
reduce the dissonance between subject and object may facilitate an appre-
ciation and application of doctrine more consistent with the objects of con-
sensual relations law however we may formulate them. Before the 
consequences of that conclusion may be revealed, it is helpful to appreciate 
the parallels between naturalism in philosophy and Contract science. 
3. The Phases of Naturalism.-Brian Leiter has traced the develop-
ment of naturalism in philosophy and has found parallels between the de-
velopment of legal realism from the mid-twentieth century and the rise of 
natural science models in contemporary philosophical inquiry. 130 While Le-
iter's very important contribution presents a convincing case for his ulti-
mate thesis about the affinity between Realism and philosophical 
naturalism, 131 the value of his work for present purposes is in Leiter's for-
129 Consideration doctrine provides an example of a fixed rule that operates inconsistently in varied 
rational and emotional contexts. Consider Duncan Kennedy's formulation of Lon Fuller's conclusions 
regarding consideration: 
According to Fuller, consideration was a doctrine that served different purposes. It was indeed a 
form (like the seal, the requirement of an acceptance to make a contract, the parol evidence rule, or 
the statute of frauds) and could be assessed as a form in terms of the functions of formalities. But 
it was also a substantive restriction on freedom of contract, justified by the functional reasons for 
refusing to enforce particular kinds of promises. 
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consid-
eration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 103 (2000). Kennedy also observed, following Fuller, that 
the consideration doctrine works more or less well depending upon the context into which its operation 
is introduced. The more the doctrine's application is invoked in a manner consistent with its fundamen-
tal formal and substantive objects, the more effective consideration is to vindicate the rational and emo-
tional reactions to promise enforcement. Kennedy formulated Fuller's Consideration and Form in these 
terms: 
Viewing consideration doctrine as a formality, we ask the extent to which, in any given situa-
tion, it promotes the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions Fuller peremptorily assigns 
to formalities. Viewing the doctrine as a restriction on freedom of contract, we ask whether the re-
striction confines enforcement appropriately, given the goals of securing private autonomy, com-
pensating reliance, and preventing unjust enrichment. A striking move in the article is to ask (with 
respect to consideration viewed as a formality) to what extent the "nature of the situation" allows 
accurate fact-finding ex post, cautions people ex ante, and clearly distinguishes the moment when 
we pass from merely moral to legally binding obligation. 
/d. It seems that consideration, the doctrine, is a shorthand for some thing or things more fundamental, 
at least in terms of Kennedy's construction of Fuller, which is a fair one so far as it goes. 
130 See Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 96; Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96. 
131 Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 96. 
The Realists came of intellectual age in a positivistic and naturalistic culture, and their approach to 
jurisprudential questions bears the mark of that origin. With the benefit of philosophical advances 
of the last thirty years, we are finally in a position to recognize what most jurisprudents have 
missed: that the Realists were not bad legal philosophers, but rather prescient ones, philosophical 
naturalists before their time. 
/d.at315. 
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mulation of the phases of naturalism. 132 The distinctions he draws are con-
sistent with the reconception of Contract urged here. 
Leiter distinguished methodological from substantive naturalism and 
then, within methodological naturalism, further distinguished the two cate-
gories of "replacement" and "normative" methodological naturalism. 
Methodological naturalism captures the science in philosophical inquiry by 
subscribing to the view that "philosophical theorizing should be continuous 
with empirical inquiry in the sciences."133 Leiter then divided methodologi-
cal naturalism into two categories which, we might suggest, describe poles 
on a continuum rather than fundamentally different forms: He distin-
guished "Hard Methodological Naturalists," who "want 'continuity with' 
only the hard or physical sciences" from "Soft Methodological Naturalists," 
who "seek 'continuity with' any successful science, natural or social."134 
Leiter confirmed that scholars writing from the evolution~ biology per-
spective are exemplars of Hard Methodological Naturalism. 13 
It may be, then, that the analysis and argument of this Article is Realistic jurisprudence in a philoso-
phical naturalist's vein. Leiter and the Realists for the most part were positing a theory of adjudica-
tion-how and why courts decide cases the way they do. The object of this Article is, at least, once 
removed. This study imposes principles of inquiry and order drawn from the natural sciences (like phi-
losophical naturalism) to learn more about the substance of and relationship among the doctrines that 
comprise the Contract law. It provides the step that is a necessary predicate of a theory of adjudication, 
a means both to study how values, principles, and rules in Contract interact in fact and how conceptions 
of them might be recast to make them more effective (ultimately transparent) components of a system of 
Contract, including Contract as a system of adjudication. 
132 Leiter recited several philosophers' formulations of"naturalism." Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 
96, at 80-81. Two in particular capture well the sense of the term that best supports the thesis urged 
here: 
[N)aturalism •. [is] not just the view that man can be seen as part of nature-in one sense or an-
other this would surely be accepted by everyone-but that the nature of which he is a part is to be 
understood according to the canons which emerged in the seventeenth-century revolution in natu-
ral science. 
ld. at 81 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 2 (1985)). "The [naturalistic) 
idea is to make sure that our philosophical theories are compatible with science .... [T]his means that in 
our philosophical theories we are to make use only of those properties that are either reducible to or su-
pervene upon properties that science countenances. . . . Science constrains philosophy." Id. (citing 
Richard Foley, Quine and Naturalized Epistemology, 19 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 243, 243 (1994)). 
133 Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 96, at 8 I. 
134 Id. at 82. 
135 Jd. (citing ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE 
JUDGMENT (1990); Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REv. 163 (1986)). Several recent articles 
have posited an evolutionary biology perspective in recurring legal contexts. See, e.g., Owen Jones, Sex, 
Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827 (1999); 
Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, From Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary Biology 
in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505 (2000). To the extent that Hard and Soft Methodological Naturalism 
describe points on a continuum, we may also imagine that a science, any science, is in a constant state of 
"development" along that continuum. That is, yesterday's soft methodology may "firm up," if you will, 
to the point where it becomes a hard methodology. It is ultimately a matter of gaining control of vari-
ables, eliminating noise, and thereby progressively diminishing the dissonance between subject and ob-
ject until we can make more accurate approximations of the reality that is the subject of the "science." 
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Leiter also placed his naturalism in philosophical-historical context by 
noting that we may attribute a "Speculative Methodological Naturalism" to 
Hume and Nietzsche: 
Hume and Nietzsche ... both construct 'speculative' theories of human na-
ture-modeled on the most influential scientific paradigm of the days (Newto-
nian mechanics, in the case of Hume; nineteenth-century physiology, in the 
case of Nietzsche)-in order to explain various human phenomena, like the 
character of morality. Their speculative theories are 'modeled' on the sciences 
most importantly in that they take over from science the idea that natural phe-
nomena have deterministic causes. 136 
The Speculative Naturalists' approach, in turn, may be distinguished 
from what Leiter terms "Substantive Naturalism": "either the (ontological) 
view that the only things that exist are natural or physical things; or the 
(semantic) view that a suitable philosophical analysis of any concept must 
show it to be amenable to empirical inquiry."137 Leiter did not find Sub-
stantive Naturalism a "promising" avenue of jurisprudential inquiry. 138 
Granted, if we measure the relative jurisprudential efficacy of Leiter's two 
forms of naturalism (methodological vs. substantive) as means to make 
sense of adjudication, a methodology may be the best that naturalism can 
provide at our current plateau of understanding and in terms of the level of 
generality we deem acceptable. 139 
We could, for example, craft a rule of consideration to accommodate 
judges' enforcement of some promises (those we want judges to enforce) 
and refuse to enforce others (those that we do not want them to enforce). 140 
A Substantive Naturalism would succeed in formulating, even institutional-
izing, that distinction if it provides a reliable means to assure that our itera-
tion of consideration provides the judges the guidance to draw the 
136 Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 96, at 83 (footnotes omitted). 
137 /d. 
138 /d. 
[A] semantic S[ubstantive] Naturalist might try to argue that legal predicates (for example, the 
predicate 'being liable for negligence') are explicable in terms amenable to empirical inquiry. An 
ontological S[ubstantive] Naturalist might try to reduce legal facts (for example, the fact of 'being 
liable for negligence') to certain physical facts. Neither program strikes me as very promising (for 
obvious reasons), which suggests that the S[ubstantive] Naturalism which is so prevalent in phi-
losophy of mind and meta-ethics may be the wrong naturalistic program for legal philosophy. 
/d. at 92. 
139 By "our current plateau of understanding" I mean the state of the so-called "hard sciences" that 
endeavor to reveal the constituents of the determinism that causes actors to behave as they do. By "level 
of generality" I mean the size of the sample whose behavior we would want the law to determine. We 
might want our jurisprudence of adjudication to describe how judges decide cases as they do and, con-
comitantly, to thereby reveal ways in which we could channel judges' decisions to realize particular ob-
jects. 
140 At this juncture, it does not matter how we might distinguish the first group of promises from the 
second; all that matters is that we can divide the world of promises into those two categories and then 
use a rule of consideration to signal to triers of law how that distinction should be respected. 
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distinction.141 We could then conclude we have realized a science of adju-
dication when the formulation of consideration determines resolution of the 
distinction between promises we want enforced from those we do not and if 
it works consistently across a sample we deem repeatable. But it is a matter 
of degree, and our current level of adjudicatory acuity often falls short of 
what could reasonably be deemed empirically verifiable. That is, for what-
ever reasons, we are unable to determine results in contested cases by refer-
ence to the legal formulations that guide triers of law. Bridging that gap 
completely is certainly beyond our current science and so, as Leiter sug-
gests, the best we can do is avoid logical mistakes by invoking a naturalistic 
methodology. 
Leiter also drew a distinction between Replacement and Normative 
Naturalism: "According to Replacement Naturalists, the goal of theorizing 
is description or explanation; according to Normative Naturalists, the goal 
is regulation of practice through the promulgation of norms and stan-
dards."142 That is the contest between "is" and "ought." Contract theory, at 
its most ambitious, pursues both of those goals, and, indeed, it might be dif-
ficult to divorce the two objects completely in any event. Even the Re-
placement Naturalist may, ultimately, have in mind a consequentialist 
object. That is, the full and complete description or explanation may ac-
commodate a normative program: looking at why people behave the way 
they do in order to change their behavior in a manner consistent with a par-
ticular normative perspective. While the "is" and the "ought" may be dis-
tinguished, the line may be fme enough to blur in less than optimal light. 
Nonetheless, the distinction is an important one that has received consider-
able attention in philosophical ratiocinations and is likely to remain a sub-
ject of philosophical inquiry.143 
Leiter posited the distinction, though, not for purposes of exploring it 
at length but rather to focus his argument on the symbiotic relationship be-
tween American Legal Realism and Replacement Naturalism. Leiter re-
prised Quine's conception of what Hilary Kornblith144 dubs the 
"replacement thesis": 
A Replacement Naturalist in any branch of philosophy holds that: For any pair 
of relata that might stand in a justificatory relation-e.g., evidence and theory, 
141 Also, for the purposes of this portion of the argument, we do not need to take account of the fact 
that judges decide cases for reasons other than those that they offer in support of their conclusions. It is 
not necessary to deny that obvious truth in order to make the point that there is an obstacle to subject-
object reconciliation even in cases in which the trier of fact wants to give effect to the object of the ap-
posite rule. Before it would even be worthwhile to address that instance of potential dissonance so far as 
adjudication is concerned, we would have to come to terms with the single constituent problem: How to 
craft the formulation of the rule so that it is consistent with the principle that vindicates the fundamental 
value. 
142 Leiter, supra note 96, at 85. 
143 See LORD LLOYD OFHAMSTED & FREEMAN, supra note 119, at 12-14. 
144 HILARY KORNBLITH, NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY 4 (1994). 
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reasons and belief, causal history and semantic or intentional content, legal 
reasons and judicial decision-if no normative account of the relation is possi-
ble, then the only theoretically fruitful account is the descriptive/explanatory 
account given by the relevant science of that domain. 145 
We need not conclude, yet, that no "normative account of the relation" 
between legal reasons and judicial decision "is possible." Leiter only 
needed to go so far to draw a parallel between Legal Realism and philoso-
phical naturalism. Just as the Realists, if Leiter was right, used such a sci-
entific approach to discover theories of adjudication, a Contract science can 
inform a perspective to discern the operation and cooperation of Contract 
doctrines as both adjudicatory and transactional determinants. 
In fact, it would be incomplete to conceive of either adjudication or 
transaction without the other. It may be that to understand Contract in the 
context of adjudication one must first understand Contract in the context of 
transaction. So a science of adjudication (perhaps Realism) must first be 
considerate of a science of Contract doctrine. Contract science is the ra-
tionalization of Realism at the level of doctrine. For example, before we 
understand how the consideration doctrine operates in litigation, we would 
need to appreciate its operation as an element of the transaction giving rise 
to the litigation. While the two-adjudicatory consideration and transac-
tional consideration-may be, indeed almost certainly are, related, they are 
not the same as objects of scientific inquiry. 
The success of Realism as a science of adjudication bodes well for the 
success of a transactional Contract science. Just as Realism has helped re-
frame our conceptions of how cases are decided by revealing the contingent 
nature of rules of decision by diminishing the subject-object dissonance, 146 
reformulation of Contract doctrine in terms that diminish subject-object dis-
sonance (the subject's recognition of promises that bind from among the ar-
ray of promises that objectively should bind) is similarly a scientific inquiry 
and similarly consistent with philosophical naturalism. 
145 Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 96, at 86-87. 
146 In Leiter's terms, the "legal reasons and judicial decision" relata standing in a "justificatory rela-
tion," are akin to the subject-object dissonance that is the province of science as conceived here. Con-
sider: 
Theories of adjudication are concerned not with the relationship between 'evidence' and 'sci-
entific theory,' but rather with the justificatory relationship between 'legal reasons' (the input, as it 
were) ['object,' in scientific terminology] and judicial decision (the output) ['subject']: theories of 
adjudication try to tell judges how they ought to justify their decisions, that is, they seek to 
'ground' judicial decision-making in reasons that require unique outcomes. The Realists are 'anti-
foundationalists' about judicial decisions in the sense that they deny that the legal reasons justify a 
unique decision: the legal reasons underdetermine the decision (at least in most cases actually liti-
gated). More precisely, the Realists claim that the law is rationally indeterminate in the sense that 
the class of legal reasons-that is, the class of legitimate reasons a judge may offer for a deci-
sion-does not provide a justification for a unique outcome. Just as sensory input does not justifY 
a unique scientific theory, so legal reasons, according to the Realists, do not justifY a unique deci-
sion. 
Leiter, Naturalism, supra note 96, at 93. 
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The realistic theory of adjudication may remain more static, or at least 
less dynamic, than the doctrine it applies. Shifting transactional patterns 
may strain the operation of rules more than they would the way judges and 
juries respond to the components of judicial decisions. Comparing theories 
of scientific revolution with conceptions of evolution in Contract doctrine 
confirm the utility of an appreciation of Contract as science. 
B. The Evolution of Contract Theory 
Science errs, and not occasionally. In fact, the story of science is a 
story of error, often compounded but also often corrected. There are means 
to measure scientific progress; for example, Larry Lauden finds progress in 
enhanced problem solving capacity.147 What matters here though, for the 
reconception of promise enforcement, is that we conceive of science as a 
progression from greater to lesser subject-object dissonance. So conceived, 
a science of Contract is revealed as no less a science than, say, astronomy. 
When Copernicus confirmed the error of Ptolemy, we were closer to under-
standing the relative positions of the Earth and Sun. There was less disso-
nance between the object (the Earth's movement relative to the Sun) and the 
subject (our understanding of that relative movement). Other examples 
abound.~'~8 
1. Theories of Scientific Revolution.-To capture the sense of sci-
ence that would inform a reevaluation of promise enforcement in Contract, 
it helps to take account of the literature on the nature of scientific develop-
ment. Contract, as an intellectual inquiry, evolves as does science: as an 
intellectual inquiry. An appreciation of the parallels between adjustments 
of understanding in science and the development of Contract doctrine re-
veals the nature of Contract "science." 
a. The Kuhnian Structure of Scientific Revolution.-In The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 149 Thomas Kuhn endeavored to put the 
147 
"I ... argue that if we take seriously the doctrine that the aim of science (and of all intellectual 
inquiry, for that matter) is the resolution or clarification of problems, then we shall have a very different 
picture of the historical evolution and the cognitive evaluation of science." LAUDEN, supra note 106, at 
12. That argument may not have been revolutionary. Kuhn had already recognized that "[p]aradigms 
gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that 
the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute." KUHN, supra note 106, at 23. 
148 KUHN, supra note 106. 
Galilee's contributions to the study of motion depended closely upon difficulties discovered in Ar-
istotle's theory by scholastic critics. Newton's new theory oflight and color originated in the dis-
covery that none of the existing pre-paradigm theories would account for the length of the 
spectrum, and the wave theory that replaced Newton's was announced in the midst of growing 
concern about anomalies in the relation of diffraction and polarization effects to Newton's theory. 
Thermodynamics was born from the collision of two existing nineteenth-century physical theories, 
and quantum mechanics from a variety of difficulties surrounding black-body radiation, specific 
heats, and the photoelectric effect 
!d. at67. 
149 !d. 
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evolution of scientific theory in intellectual context by describing in generic 
terms the course of paradigmatic shift in, primarily, the natural sciences. 
He began with a definition of paradigm, 150 and from there described how 
crisis causes paradigms to shift. That description has been an enduring, but 
controversial, 151 contribution of Kuhn's theory: "Failure of existing rules is 
the prelude to a search for new ones."152 
It is when the paradigm begins to fail, or at least fails to respond to 
newly discovered phenomena, that there is "crisis" which, in turn, signals 
the advent of a new paradigm that resolves puzzles insoluble during the pe-
riod of normal science under the prior, now deficient, paradigm. The proc-
ess Kuhn described is a gradual one, both in "hard science" and law: 
"There is no sharp dividing line. Instead, by proliferating versions of the 
paradigm, crisis loosens the rules of normal ruzzle-solving in ways that ul-
timately permit a new paradigm to emerge."1 3 
Kuhn's work is a landmark and has attracted responses both from those 
interested in the course of scientific revolution and from those concerned 
with epistemology. The two sections that follow consider the contributions 
of two commentators in particular whose responses to Kuhn invoke ideas 
that support a reconception of Contract. 
b. Laudan 's Theory of Scientific Growth.-With Laudan, as 
with Kuhn, the object is to distill from commentary on scientific revolution, 
or evolution, the distinctive substance of science in terms that facilitate re-
conception of Contract. Though Laudan was responding to Kuhn and 
150 
"[Scientific revolutionaries] shared two essential characteristics. Their achievement was suffi-
ciently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scien-
tific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the 
redefined group of practitioners to resolve." !d. at 10. Achievements that share these two characteristics 
I shall henceforth refer to as "paradigms," a term that relates closely to "normal science." 
It is paradigm that structures scientific inquiry, much as it is legal doctrine, say, the "bargain" re-
quirement, that structures legal discourse. What, at first blush, distinguishes the two areas of inquiry 
would be the sense of precision: Both "gravity" and "bargain" are labels for phenomena rather than ex-
planations for the relationships they describe. We may not know what gravity is, but we have no trouble 
finding its manifestations. Conversely, we may think we know what bargain is but we have more trou-
ble agreeing upon its manifestations. In both instances, though, we use the terms to practice science, 
that is, to reduce subject-object dissonance. Gravity describes two bodies' attraction; bargain describes 
when a promise binds. Were it not for paradigms, we could not develop concepts because all we would 
have would be masses of data without an organizing principle to define their interrelation: "In the ab-
sence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the 
development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant." !d. at 15. "[E]xisting theory ... 
predict[s] factual information of intrinsic value." !d. at 30. A corollary of that observation might be that 
theory also restricts the factual information deemed to be of intrinsic value. 
151 See HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 141-43; Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Method-
ology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRJTICISM AND THE GROWTH OF .KNOWLEDGE 91 (Imre 
Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970); LAUDAN, supra note 106, at 73-76. 
152 KUHN, supra note 106, at 68. 
153 ld. at 80. 
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found deficiencies in Kuhn's conclusions, 154 there is much in Laudan that 
complements Kuhnian theory and in doing so confirms the plausibility of 
Contract science. In applying Laudan, as in applying Kuhn, discerning the 
connection between Contract and science is not accomplished by making 
Contract more empirical but, instead, by conceiving of science in less em-
pirical terms: 
[E]mpirical problems are frequently solved because for problem solving pur-
poses we do not require an exact, but only an approximate, resemblance be-
tween theoretical results and experimental ones. . . . As should be clear, the 
notion of solution is highly relative and comparative in a way that the notion of 
explanation is not. 155 · 
We solve problems because we agree to solve them; it is expedient to do so, 
and constant focus on explanation rather than solution would confound the 
problem-solving process. 
What emerges is a picture of constantly shifting variables, subject and 
object that are not fixed but actually elusive, defying resolution by reference 
to constant values: 
the overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by assess-
ing the number and importance of the empirical problems which the theory 
solves and deducting therefrom the number and importance of anomalies and 
conceptual problems which the theory generates . ... Most often, of course, 
progress occurs as a result of all the relevant variables shifting subtly.156 
Analogously, from that perspective, static conceptions of, for example, of-
fer, acceptance, agreement, bargain, and consideration are a drag on rather 
than a key to development of consensual relations law. 
Laudan also exposed the real danger of our conceiving of an intellec-
tual construction, a theory or methodology, in terms that do not recognize 
the impact the construction has on understanding phenomena and reducing 
subject-object dissonance; static conceptions retard progress: 
Even before specific theories are formulated within a tradition, and continu-
ously thereafter, a research tradition will often strongly influence (though it 
does notfully determine) the range with which its component theories must 
grapple. 
If, for instance, the methodology of a research tradition specifies-as it 
will-certain experimental techniques which alone are the legitimate 
investigational modes for determining what are the data to be explained, then it 
is clear that only 'phenomena' which can be explored by those means can, in 
ts4 See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 106, at 73-76. 
ISS /d. at 23. 
ts6 !d. at 68. 
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princwe, count as legitimate empirical problems for theories within that tradi-
tion.' 
The research terminology fixes the scope of inquiry, the "box" out of which 
we seldom stray, as in Contract the terminology of the doctrine fixes the pa-
rameters of analysis. 
c. Hoyningen-Huene 's Reconstruction of Kuhn's Scientific 
Revolutions.-Much of Hoyningen-Huene's treatment of Kuhn focused on 
the gap between subject and object that it is the province of science to 
bridge. At the outset we must acknowledge that almost by definition it is 
impossible to bridge the subject-object gap. There is simply no way to be 
certain that what I describe as red looks to me the same as the red you de-
scribe looks to you. More prosaically, 
We are here dealing with a "pathway of doubt" vis-a-vis our phenomenal 
world which might more precisely be called 'the way of despair. For what 
happens on it is not what is ordinarily understood when the word "doubt" is 
used: shilly-shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to 
that truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled-so that at the 
end of the process, the matter is taken to be what it was in the first place. On 
the contrary, this path is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal 
knowledge.' 158 
There is, then, from Hoyningen-Huene's perspective, an overwhelming 
impediment to explanation in Laudan's sense. The best we can do is re-
duce subject-object dissonance; we can not resolve it completely. That is 
"despair" in the natural sciences. 
The empiricism of the natural sciences is a matter of degree. So we 
make the case for the reconception of Contract not by asserting the empiri-
cal verifiability of Contract conceptions but by revealing that the resolution 
of subject-object dissonance in the hard sciences is not a different type of 
intellectual exercise than is the resolution of fact (stimuli)-law (sensation) 
dissonance in matters of jurisprudence. The value of obscuring if not actu-
ally obliterating that empirical line in the sand is not in its denigration ofthe 
natural sciences by association with the social sciences. The value is in 
nurturing a different conception of the terminology and intellectual con-
157 LAUDAN, supra note 106, at 86-87. Laudan offered an example that captures well the Contract 
parallel: 
A classic example of this process is offered by nineteenth-century phenomenological chemistry. 
Scientists in this tradition argued that the only legitimate problems to be solved by the chemist 
were those which concerned the observable relations of chemical reagents. Thus, to ask how this 
acid and this base react to form this salt is to pose an authentic problem. But to ask how atoms 
combine to form diatomic molecules cannot conceivably count as an empirical problem because 
the methodology of the research tradition denies the possibility of empirical knowledge of entities 
the size of atoms and molecules. 
!d. at 87. 
158 HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 67-68 n.12 (citing and quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 49-50 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977)). 
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structions that are the agents of Contract. 
Such a perspective may also help distinguish instrumental doctrine, 
real aids to understanding, to reducing subject-object dissonance, from 
dogma, slogans that label decisions after the fact but afford little guidance 
to understanding. That is, we can say that A's promise to B is binding, 
gives rise to a Contract, if B may enforce that promise to the extent of, per-
haps, B's expectation interest, once there is a sufficient meeting of the 
minds of A and B given the context in which their deal proceeds. We can 
also say that A's promise to B forms a Contract if the promise is the product 
of bargain. Which formulation is better law? 
The more dynamic sense of agreement, a sufficient meeting of the 
minds, accommodates an appreciation of the interaction among the values, 
principles, and rules and between some values and others, some principles 
and others, and some rules and others, that comprise Contract. We may de-
pict a particular quantum of agreement as a bargain. So conceived, the ra-
tional units of Contract are aids to understanding rather than impediments to 
analysis. We can, to answer Craswell, rationalize our belief that "the condi-
tions under which it is excusable to break a promise to the poor [in fact do 
have] connection . . . with the conditions under which it is excusable to 
break a business promise, or a promise to a friend."159 Actually, we resolve 
the tension not by demonstrating that there is no connection between the 
two contexts, but by offering a richer sense of the interrelation between and 
among the rational units of Contract at work in those two contexts. And to 
rationalize apparently dissonant conclusions in a range of transactional set-
tings, some more evolved than others, is to appreciate and give effect to the 
best traditions of scientific revolution. 
The following section confirms that a reappraisal of the function of le-
gal conceptions is appropriate and worthwhile by demonstrating that Con-
tract doctrine necessarily assumes the intellectual shape, if you will, of the 
constituents of the "harder" sciences. It is only when we deny such proper-
ties of Contract that we exacerbate rather than reduce subject-object disso-
nance in the Contract law. 
2. Theories of Scientific Revolution Applied to Contract Evolution.-
Contract terminology, because it is at least once removed from Contract in 
fact, has obscured the evolution of Contract theory. We continue to resolve 
Contract questions into matters of consideration, offer, acceptance, bargain, 
and the like. But it is necessary to recognize how accepted Contract termi-
nology may even retard the evolution of Contract. 
You get a sense of the way Contract terminology works if you apply 
Kuhn's conception of the way paradigms work to Contract. Paradigms im-
pose a structure on rationalization that sufficiently accommodates consen-
159 Craswell, supra note 11, at 491. 
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sus. The consensus dilemma160 assures that there will be more apparent 
than real consensus, but, for most purposes, that is good enough. It gener-
ally matters more that we agree consideration is an element of Contract than 
it does that we agree why it is indispensable. In most cases, close enough is 
good enough, and certainly no less in Contract science than in the natural 
sciences. 
It is not, then, surprising that Kuhn's description of paradigms in sci-
ence evokes Contract conceptions: "Scientists can ... agree in their identi-
fication of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, 
a full interpretation or rationalization of it."161 The Contract rules of con-
sideration, offer, acceptance, and bargain comprise a paradigm based on the 
principles of intent or reliance. 162 "A full interpretation or rationalization" 
of that Contract paradigm would require reliable conclusions about the val-
ues that support the intent and reliance principles that in tum support the 
paradigmatic rules. 
Recall that Laudan, too, recognized the relative nature of solution and 
distinguished that from our expectations for explanation: "[T]he notion of 
solution is highly relative and comparative in a way that the notion of ex-
planation is not."163 It is not a great leap for students of Contract to appreci-
ate the parallels between Laudan's view of problem solving and what we do 
in deciding when a promise binds. If we will enforce a promise only when 
it is the product of bargain (the "theoretical results"), determining when a 
particular promise is in fact a promise and coincidently is the product of 
something we call "bargain" (the "empirical result") is not a matter of "ex-
act" but only "approximate" resemblance. 
Laudan also revealed the dynamic of scientific explanation. Our ex-
pectations evolve: "Unless we acknowledge that the criteria for acceptable 
problem solutions do themselves evolve through time, the history of 
thought will seem enigmatic indeed."164 Newtonian physics answers 
enough questions short of the speed of light, but we need relativity to make 
sense ofblack holes. "Bargain" explains arms' length transactions between 
nineteenth-century artisans, but we need revised conceptions of inferable 
volition to make sense of "point and click" contracting. What was always 
an approximation, a shorthand for and shortcut to intent, becomes a means 
to frustrate rather than effectuate expectations when technology and trans-
actional patterns shift. 
160 See supra note 34. 
161 KUHN, supra note I 06, at 44. 
162 This, at least, is a popular conception. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 10; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 18; see also S. Toulmin, Does the Distinction 
Between Normal and Revolutionary Science Hold Water?, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF 
KNOWLEDGE 39, 40 (1970). 
84 
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The fact that our Contracts terminology, its faults notwithstanding, 
does not wholly undermine transactions (at least not yet) is a function of the 
relationship between the forms (for example, consideration, offer, accep-
tance, bargain) and the phenomena they seek to order. In turn, the contin-
ued efficacy of those forms is a product of their relationship with a level of 
consensus, and evolving transaction patterns; and those two constituents 
(consensus and transaction) are themselves interrelated. The level of con-
sensus is determined by the frequency, familiarity, and accessibility of the 
transactional pattern. The extent to which the Contract forms work, and 
this is a matter of degree, is determined by the fit among them in a con-
text-by their interdependence. 
Contract conceptions such as consideration, offer, acceptance, and bar-
gain obscure the relationships that determine their cooperation. It may be 
that P .S. Atiyah captures the correct sense in his attribution to David Hume 
of the animating principle of Contract: "Promises are binding for reasons 
of human convenience."165 But that is no more instructive, in the way sci-
ence instructs by reducing subject-object dissonance, than it would be to 
say that Contract is a good thing, or a bad thing. Just as the standard Con-
tract terminology often gets us no (or not much) closer to the how and why 
of promise enforcement, Contract theory that is inconsiderate of the rela-
tionship between and among the (1) rational units of Contract (captured in 
its terminology), (2) consensus about them, and (3) evolving transactional 
patterns, ultimately frustrates rather than serves the evolution of Contract 
theory. 
The question remains: If our Contract terms work against us by forc-
ing the dynamic into a static mold, why do we continue to conform our 
thinking about the enforceability of promises to the forms that the terminol-
ogy dictates? The answer must certainly be that the terminology, even if it 
is not the best aid to understanding or resolving recurring controversies, 
does not get in the way. It may be that, over time, as transactional patterns 
evolve, our answers become less exact and more approximate because the 
object of the answers is solution, not explanation, and the terminology ob-
scures explanation in order to accomplish solution. To capture the extent to 
which Contract has become a slave to its methodology, ask yourself why 
"bargain," in the "agreement to exchange"166 sense, matters. It may be that, 
in fact, bargain does not matter beyond its role in discouraging the evolu-
tion of Contract theory. While it is premature to reach that conclusion, pos-
ing the question formulates the application of Laudan to a reconception of 
Contract. 
To appreciate the more complete picture, consider Hoyningen-Huene's 
identification of the cause for despair in the natural sciences: the fun dam en-
165 P .S. ATIY AH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRAcr 53 (1979). 
166 REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS § 3 (1981). "[A]greement," in tum, is defined as "a 
manifestation ofmutua1 assent on the part of two or more persons." ld. 
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tal untruth of phenomenological knowledge. If that "despair" gets in the 
way of understanding the interaction of molecules, imagine how it might 
confound a science of Contract. In fact, there is no need to imagine; the 
proliferation of theories of promise enforcement suffice to confirm the 
teleological and deontological cacophony of Contract.167 Hoyningen-Huene 
observed that Kuhn recognized the great phenomenological divide. 168 
This section and the preceding sections have brought into focus the fit 
between the natural sciences and Contract science. They established the 
predicate that Contract, the study of the interrelated values, principles, and 
rules determining when promises bind, shares fundamental premises with 
the modes of inquiry that resolve the problems confronting the natural sci-
ences. The next section confirms the affinity between the naturalist per-
167 Kuhn's 1969 Postscript made that point vividly in the context of the natural sciences: 
Notice now that two groups, the members of which have systematically different sensations on re-
ceipt of the same stimuli, do in some sense live in different worlds. . . . To the extent, of course, 
that individuals belong to the same group and thus share education, language, experience, and cul-
ture, we have good reason to suppose that their sensations are the same .... But where the differ-
entiation and specialization of groups begins, we have no similar evidence for the immutability of 
sensation. Mere parochialism, I suspect, makes us suppose that the route from stimuli [object] to 
sensation [subject] is the same for all members of all groups. 
KUHN, supra note 106, at 193. Hoyningen-Huene described that as Kuhn's "critical epistemological 
standpoint." He explained, 
[f]rom the particular critical epistemological standpoint characteristic of Kuhn's theory ... the as-
sumption of the pure object-sidedness of ... stimuli is no longer tenable. The premise that the 
world I (and other members of my community) take to be real, is, in the same way, the real world 
for all humans, which appeared so self-evident from the natural standpoint, is now called into 
question. . . . Any substantive assumption about the nature of stimuli constitutes a prejudice in fa-
vor of some particular phenomenal world (or some particular class of phenomenal worlds) and is 
thus to all appearances a methodological error. 
HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 5, at 46-47. That sensory nihilism is unnerving, but does provide an 
explanation of intellectual tension within and across disciplines. For social scientists, who probably to 
an extent think of such political conflict as the determining characteristic of their discipline, it may be 
particularly striking to recognize that even physics, if we are to take the critical epistemological view-
point seriously, is the product of the political forces, broadly defined, that shape all human interactions 
and therefore all consensus regarding subject-object dissonance. 
168 HOYNlNGEN-HUENE, supra note 5. 
On this issue, Kuhn himself claims at one point that, at least for scientists, a transcendence of 
one's own phenomenal world complete enough to allow an unbiased survey of all possible phe-
nomenal worlds is impossible, though a scientist situated in a given historical context might face a 
choice between two possible phenomenal worlds. We must therefore conclude that Kuhn would 
deny the possibility of such a completely neutral standpoint for the philosopher or historian of sci-
ence as well. 
/d. at 68 (citing Thomas S. Kuhn, Discussion in F. SUPPE (ED.), THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
THEORIES 509 (1974)). 
That realization provoked Kuhn to conclude that political power has determined the course of scien-
tific inquiry; at least that is the spin put on Kuhn's observations: "Thus, both Kuhn and Feyerabend con-
clude that scientific decision making is basically a political and propagandist affair, in which prestige, 
power, age, and polemic decisively determine the outcome of the struggle between competing theories 
and theorists." LAUDAN, supra note 106, at 4; cf Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (treating relationship among law, individualism, and capi-
talism). 
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spective and the reconception of Contract offered here in terms of the strain 
that evolving transactional patterns impose on the ostensibly fixed struc-
tures governing promise enforcement. 
C. Categories of Contract 
Contract is not monolithic: This Article demonstrates that even in re-
sponse to the simple question "When does a promise bind?," the answer 
must be, "It depends." It is not enough to put the hypothetical "A promises 
B to build an arc"; before we know whether what we are talking about 
really is a "promise" we need to know who A and B are and, probably, what 
an "arc" is. As transactional patterns evolve, the static rules, the fzxed 
forms, deteriorate because the relationship among them evolves coinciden-
tally. Contract can and does respond to that evolution; but it may do so 
haltingly and, therefore, quite imperfectly. 
For the most part, our response to deterioration of the rules is to prom-
ulgate exceptional categories which, in time, become less exceptional. In 
an ultimately worthwhile contribution to the literature, 169 Melvin Eisenberg 
surveyed the operation of the unconscionability doctrine as a limitation on 
the bargain principle.170 He concluded that in four categories of Contract 
cases the bargain principle defers to the unconscionability doctrine: exploi-
tation of distress, transactional incapacity, unfair persuasion, and price ig-
norance. Though each of those contexts is the product of a number of 
factors, a common denominator seems to be the sophistication discontinui-
ties that result among diverse transactors.171 But Eisenberg's study reveals 
only one way in which Contract may "conform" to factual scenarios that 
strain its fabric: the creation of exceptional categories. There are certainly 
169 Eisenberg, supra note 106. The work's economic analyses may be incomplete, but elaboration 
on that conclusion would be beyond the scope of this Article and, in any event, is not crucial to the ar-
gument here. 
170 Professor Eisenberg offered a conception ofbargain to support his analysis: 
By bargain, I mean an exchange in which each party views the performance that he undertakes as 
the price of the performance undertaken by the other. . . . By the bargain principle, I mean the 
common law rule that, in the absence of a traditional defense relating to the quality of consent 
(such as duress, incapacity, misrepresentation, or mutual mistake), the courts will enforce a bar-
gain according to its terms, with the object of putting a bargain-promisee in as good a position as if 
the bargain had been performed. 
Eisenberg, supra note 106, at 742. For the expression of the unconscionability doctrine, Eisenberg re-
lied on the Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-302 and the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 
formulations. !d. at 750-51. 
171 The hypothelicals that Eisenberg built to support his discussion of the four unconscionability 
contexts are neither dependent on nor the product of transactional evolution that has rendered the older 
forms unsuitable to contemporary contexts. Evolving transactional patterns would exacerbate rule-
context dissonance in ways similar to those investigated by Eisenberg but on a broader scale. That is, 
for example, the information asymmetries that give rise to unconscionable price ignorance may be more 
common as the subject matter of Contract becomes more complex, say, computer software, and the 
forms of contracting more expeditious, such as "point and click" contracting. 
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other examples of Contract terminology's failing Contract analysis. 172 
Roy Kreitner demonstrated the malleability of Contract in terms that 
support the observations offered here. 173 Gambling contracts are generally 
unenforceable. 174 Gambling is an allocation of risk. Contracts are an allo-
cation of risk. All contracts are a gamble. That progression, with the ap-
pearance, if not the substance, of syllogism, captures the paradox that 
Kreitner analyzed in terms that expose the evolution of the foundation of 
Contract. 
The challenge for Contract, so far as gambling is concerned, is to dis-
tinguish between those allocations of risk that are legitimate, for example, 
insurance contracts (betting you or a loved one will die), and illegitimate al-
locations of risk, for exam?,le, betting on a poker game (in a state that has 
not legalized that activity). 75 Kreitner traced the historical development of 
the distinction and offered observations that betray the contrast between the 
static nature of Contract rules and the dynamic nature of Contract practice: 
"While a twenty-first-century reader may be mildly surprised at the connec-
tion between commodities trading or insurance and gambling, for the nine-
teenth-century mind, the topics were almost inextricably linked."176 
Kreitner described the development of Contract that ultimately came to 
support a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate allocations of risk 
by reference to the parties' intent. The proscription against gambling con-
tracts, a fixed rule, gives way to transactional realities, and in so doing re-
veals the risk inherent in all Contract: 
The practice of wagering is controlled by the court's reserving its power to 
invalidate contracts made with the express intention of circumventing the pro-
hibition on gambling. But this power is no longer exercised by applying a 
simple label of wager; instead, the court shows itself willing to delve deep into 
the facts in order to distinguish the good wager from the bad wager. . . . The 
court thus recognizes the difficulty of upholding an analytical distinction be-
tween transactions that can be characterized as wagers and those that can not, 
and, abandoning that distinction (without saying so overtly), takes the affirma-
tive step and responsibility of distinguishing between legitimate and illegiti-
mate transactions.177 
Note particularly the emphasized language. It tells a story not just of the 
courts' solution of a characterization issue in a class of contracts; it depicts 
172 Perhaps, most notably, the development of promissory estoppel marks the failure of traditional 
bargain conceptions. See supra text accompanying notes 56-77. 
173 Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned 
to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1096 (2000). 
174 See id. at 1096 n.l. 
175 
"Whether at the tum of the century or today, labeling transactions as wagers is one way to limit 
freedom of contract." !d. at I 098. 
176 !d. at 1099. 
177 !d. at 1121 (emphasis added). 
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the state of Contract science. Kreitner described an instance in which the 
courts do not acknowledge that the lines they draw are not defined by pre-
vailing Contract categories and the relationship among the elements of Con-
tract. What makes Kreitner's contribution so important is not that he 
brought attention to an instance of Contract incongruity; he illustrated much 
more. The good vs. bad wager (enforceable vs. unenforceable promise) di-
chotomy Kreitner revealed is very much a product of general Contract sci-
ence, not an anomaly. 
The commentators who have redefined Contract by drawing distinc-
tions among recurring contexts by reference to information asymmetries178 
will only get so far. It is one thing to distinguish the sale of a tractor from 
one farmer to another from the sale of a Thunderbird from Ford to a con-
sumer. We can fashion rules to take into account the parties' relative so-
phistication.179 But in the course of doing so we merely invoke the 
vengeance of Occam's razor-obscuring the fundamental principle by pro-
liferation of rules. 
This is not to argue, however, that we would be better off constructing 
vague statements designed to include every contingency without appreciat-
ing important bases of distinction. That would accomplish no more than a 
confirmation of H.L.A. Hart's ascriptive language: 180 the pronouncement 
of legal conclusion rather than the description of a "hard fact" about the 
phenomenal world. 181 Contract requires more. That more is the subject of 
the next Part. 
IV. SYNTHESIS 
This Part, first, describes the problems that emerge from an apprecia-
tion of the ascriptive nature of the term "bargain." It then considers t4e im-
pact of context on the determination of interrelations. Finally, it suggests 
the course of further inquiry that would inform reevaluation of the constitu-
ents of Contract. 
178 See supra note 11. 
179 And, in fact, the U.C.C. does just that. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-205 (2000) (finn offers in the case 
of a merchant); U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) (2000) (special provision regarding unconscionability in consumer 
lease context). 
lSD See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 
{n.s.) 171 {1949); H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in EsSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY 21, 23-6 {1983), both cited in Schauer, supra note 44, at 1221 n.18, in the course of 
his discussion of "thick descriptions," descriptions which use words that "are not only descriptive, be-
cause, in the process of describing, the describer is also making or subscribing to a nonnative or evalua-
tive claim made by someone else or by society at large." Id. at 1221 (citing PHILIPA FOOT, Moral 
Arguments, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER EsSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96 (1978); JUDITH 
JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 10-20 (1990)). 
181 Frederick Schauer, supra note 44, at 1221. Actually, at an extreme, it is difficult to think of very 
much language that is not "ascriptive" in the Hart sense or "thick" in the Foot sense, at least so far as 
Schauer comes to tenns with those conceptions. 
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The term "bargain" is a conclusion; its invocation describes the cir-
cumstances from which consequences necessarily flow. If there is a bar-
gain there are enforceable promises and sanctions for their breach. The 
term, then, is not an analytical device. It merely restates the question. 
Now, this might not have always been true. When the circumstances in 
which mutual promises were to be enforced were less clear, bargain an-
swered an important question-it told us that a promise was enforceable 
when it was the product of bargain. That was a contribution to the law at a 
time when the enforceability of promises was not taken for granted. Also, 
bargain provides an explanation of consideration. 182 Insofar as the caution-
ary and evidentiary qualities of consideration 183 might be satisfied by a writ-
ing, bargain preserves another role for consideration. 
Further, bargain distinguishes a range of fact patterns in which prom-
ises would be enforceable because they were mutual from one in which 
promises might not be enforceable because they were not mutual. Unbar-
gained-for promises could still be enforced, but to do so we would need to 
find the elements of promissory estoppel or some other bargain surrogate184 
satisfied. 
But it is the ascriptive character of bargain that engenders the incom-
mensurability that, in turn, exacerbates rather than reduces subject-object 
dissonance. For example, if we take bargain to connote an "agreement to 
exchange,"185 we engender incommensurability by inviting, even requiring, 
analysis that is dependent on subjective, and necessarily inaccessible, de-
terminants. Whether two minds in fact "meet" to form agreement is a mat-
ter of degree insofar as one mind can never be superimposed on another 
without some dissonance between them. Nevertheless, we can say that they 
"meet" when the dissonance is within acceptable parameters-even when 
their consonance depends on qualitative differences among variables that 
cannot be reduced to vectors on a single dimension of evaluation.186 
182 See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and accepted 
as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted 
as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole 
matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consid-
eration and promise. 
/d. at 293-94. 
183 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799,800 (1941). 
184 Perhaps, even, misrepresentation. See Gordley, supra note 77, at 580. 
ISS REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 ( 1981 ). 
186 Cf Posner, supra note 44, at 1185 (describing incommensurability as the circumstance in which 
"choice depends on qualitative differences between options that cannot be reduced to vectors on a single 
dimension of evaluation"). Adler's definition, see supra note 44, works less well in this setting because, 
for the sense in which the incommensurability considered here operates in parallel conceptions of bar-
gain, values are not implicated. But they certainly could be, and then it would be worthwhile, even nec-
essary, to invoke Adler's alternative definitions of incommensurability. It is not necessary, though, to 
consider that enhanced level of complexity in order to make the point asserted in the text. 
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If, instead, we focus on the relation among elements that actually de-
termines when a promise will be enforceable, then we replace the incom-
mensurability of bargain with a set of vectors that do admit of comparison. 
We may not agree that there has been a "meeting of the minds," but we 
could agree that, empirically, "[p]ayment preceding the revelation of full 
terms is common"187 in an array of recurring transactional contexts. Fur-
ther, we will be able to better discern the relationship among that set of vec-
tors and shifting transactional patterns. The challenges presented by new 
contexts (for example, the advent of "point and click" contracting or its 
successor) may be seen as amenable to a shift in the relation among those 
vectors. So long as the rational unit, bargain, is the product of the interrela-
tion of context-dependant variables, we may think of those variables in 
terms that vindicate comparison among them to appreciate better the char-
acter of the rational unit itself, and so respond to the perception dilemma. 188 
We then reduce consensus error, the misleading signal sent when different 
actors reach the same conclusion for different reasons (thereby giving the 
appearance of consensus by masking the constituent disagreements).189 
We can imagine that in Hill190 the value of the goods, the regularity of 
the transactional pattern, the sophistication of the transactors, the buyer's 
right of return, the contract term in issue, and perhaps other considerations 
as well, combined to support the court's conclusion that the buyer's prom-
ise was enforceable, notwithstanding the fact that the buyer "agreed" to it 
without perhaps ever having seen it. There was bargain enough; had the 
price been higher, the transactional form (a phone order) less common, the 
Hills less sophisticated, the contract term in issue more onerous, the court 
may have concluded that there was no bargain, no enforceable promise. 
Contract science merely requires that we acknowledge the interrelation of 
factors that supported the court's determination. In time, we may come to 
appreciate those elements as well as others as constituents of bargain. For 
now it suffices to make the point that we are likely to understand Contract 
better if we replace bargain with generic statements of those variable and 
interdependent considerations and that Contract science makes clear the 
good sense of referring to bargain enough, good sense obscured by analy-
ses that mask the constituents of bargain. Contract so reconceived also 
demonstrates that it is not merely context that determines the enforceability 
187 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
188 See supra note 33. 
189 For example, you and I might both agree that a particular representation of a promise should not 
be enforced, you because you believe that the promisor lacked capacity and I because I believe that there 
was not a sufficient memorandum of agreement. Similarly we could both agree that there was not a bar-
gain in fact, you because of the timing of the responsive communications between the parties and I be-
cause the subject matter of the contract was not fixed with sufficient certainty. If all we have to label the 
pertinent rational unit is "promise" or "bargain," then the ascriptive nature of the terms camouflages dis-
sonance as consonance. 
190 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 {7th Cir. 1997). 
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of a promise, but the constituents of context that do so. 
Recall Richard Craswell's conclusion that it is the transactional setting, 
primarily the relative economic power and sophistication of promisor and 
promisee, that determines the enforceability of a promise. 191 That sugges-
tion is correct, but incomplete. Before we can decide whether there was a 
bargain, we need to take into account the question that the bargain calculus 
endeavors to answer. If bargain matters with regard to the damages issues, 
as in Evra, 192 we may conclude there is no bargain. If we use bargain to de-
termine the nature and extent of the promises made by the transactors, as in 
Hill, 193 we may decide that, given the particular term in issue, there is 
enough bargain to support enforcement. 
While we are comfortable generally analyzing the course of the par-
ties' communication to see if we conclude there has been an accepted offer, 
we do not acknowledge that what constitutes an exchange of offer and ac-
ceptance in one setting, with transactors at one level of sophistication, will 
not constitute an offer and acceptance in the next, and it should not. "Point 
and click" might suffice to form an agreement that the person sitting at a 
personal computer agrees to update her email address at the request of the 
service provider, but it would likely not suffice if the service provider were 
trying to enforce the individual's promise to send five hundred dollars each 
month to the provider to remain on a mailing list. A court trying to resolve 
that distinction in terms of fixed and invariable rational units of Contract 
will likely need to obscure its analysis. Contract science accommodates a 
focus on the relation among those same rational units and in terms of con-
text. 
It is such a focus on the interrelation among rational units that responds 
to the incommensurability that undermines the operation of Contract doc-
trine. Recall Evra and Judge Posner's application of the Contract doctrine 
governing consequential damages, derived from Hadley v. Baxendale.194 
Reasonable people could, and did, 195 reach different conclusions about Hy-
man-Michaels's right to recover the full economic loss it suffered when it 
lost the valuable ship charter as a result of Swiss Bank's failure to effect the 
payment instruction. Judge Posner's opinion recited the rule of Hadley: 
"consequential damages will not be awarded unless the defendant was put 
on notice of the special circumstances giving rise to them."196 
The court's analysis, though, took account of factors unrelated to the 
plaintiffs having actually apprised the defendant of the potential loss: 
191 See supra note I I. 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 79-87. 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 89-93. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 79-87. 
195 See Mark Budnitz, The Finicky Computer, the Paperless Telex and the Fallible Swiss: Bank 
Technology and the Law, 25 B.C. L. REV. 259 (1984). 
196 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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[Swiss Bank] knew or should have known, from Continental Bank's previous 
telexes, that Hyman-Michaels was paying the Pandora Shipping Company for 
the hire of a motor vessel named Pandora. But it did not know when payment 
was due, what the terms of the charter were, or that they had turned out to be 
extremely favorable to Hyman-Michaels. And it did not know that Hyman-
Michaels knew the Pandora's owner would try to cancel the charter, and 
probably would succeed, if Hyman-Michaels was ever again late in making 
payment, or that despite this peril Hyman-Michaels would not try to pay until 
the last possible moment and in the event of a delay in transmission would not 
do everything in its power to minimize the consequences of the delay. 197 
The court apparently would have been satisfied if the defendant were aware 
of the extent of the plaintiffs potential loss, without regard to whether the 
plaintiffhad actually notified the defendant of that potential. 
Ultimately, the court fixed the terms of the bargain, and thereby the ex-
tent of the defendant's exposure, by reference to the relation between the 
parties: "[T]he animating principle of Hadley ... is that the costs of the un-
toward consequence of a course of dealings should be borne by that pa~ 
who was able to avert the consequence at least cost and failed to do so."1 8 
That is an elaboration of the Hand Formula, B<PL, in the Contracts context. 
It is the relation among the variables, for which B<PL provides the short-
hand, that determines the parties' bargain. That application of the Hand 
Formula in Contract may appear starker because Evra straddles the Con-
tract-Tort divide. 
The reconception of Contract to restate the relations among rational 
units in Contract and to reformulate those rational units facilitates a healthy 
transparency in doctrine. The consequential damages rule of Hadley, the 
Restatement of Contracts, 199 or Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code200 is an application of bargain. It fixes the parties' allocation of risk 
by reference to a B<PL-like Tort formula.201 Parties drafting a consequen-
tial damages provision before a loss, as well as courts fixing the parties' al-
location of risk for consequential damages after the fact, do so by reference 
to more rich contextual fabric than would be the case if the relations be-
tween the risk and the parties' relative standing in relation to that risk were 
not a part of the calculus. There is room in the application of the rule for 
consideration of the attendant principles and the values informing them that 
would be obscured if the rule were simply that consequential damages are 
not recoverable unless expressly provided for in a writing memorializing 
the parties' agreement. 
197 !d. at 956. 
198 !d. at 957. 
199 See supra note 78. 
200 !d. 
201 Perhaps with a "cheapest cost avoider" qualification. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF 
ACCIDENTS (1970). 
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The court is able to reach a result considerate of context because the 
Hadley consequential damages rule diminishes incommensurability by re-
sponding to the perception and consensus dilemmas. The inquiry is stated 
in terms of what the parties constructively understood (responding to the 
perception dilemma) and in terms of what result is fair (invocation of the 
utilitarian Hand Formula-like balancing: Who was in the best position to 
avoid the loss?). Without that structure, we would be left with an investiga-
tion of the parties' bargain in fact: Did they agree to a particular allocation 
of the risks attending their transaction? They certainly did not-the best we 
can do is structure their bargain after the fact. 
Hadley and Evra fix the bargain (with regard to consequential dam-
ages) and demonstrate how Contract can respond to incommensurability by 
focusing on the relation between transactional context and bargain. Con-
tract science would invoke that type of context-determined statement of 
Contract doctrine for all of the rational units of Contract, but would also go 
further. It would recognize that the relative consideration exchanged can 
determine the sum and substance of bargain: Would we get the same result 
if misplacement of the telex resulted in the plaintiffs loss of $50, $500, or 
$5,000? Would we get the same result if, in fine print unread by the bank 
receiver of the telex, there were a legend to the effect that by agreeing once 
to accept a payment telex the bank would be liable for the full amount of 
any consequential loss occasioned by its failure to handle properly a pay-
ment telex in the future-in which case the terms of the parties' offer and 
acceptance would be in issue? 
From those premises, the sense of Contract reconceived emerges: The 
context of exchange determines the substance exchanged and context is the 
expression of relation. That statement may be subject to corollaries that 
capture the role of familiar rational units in the Contract mosaic. For ex-
ample, with regard to bargain, we may conclude that a constituent of con-
text is the inference of agreement. Such a corollary assures that the rational 
unit, agreement, is maintained but constrained. The extent to which the par-
ties' accomplish their transaction pursuant to the agreement inferred from 
their expression is an element of context, and thereby may determine the 
substance of their exchange more accurately than sterile conceptions of 
bargain alone. 
While the basis of promise enforcement is the inference of volition, the 
recitation of the Contract formation rules provides scant guidance concern-
ing the proper bases upon which that inference may be founded. The con-
stituents of Contract must be derived from the array of factors that 
determine the inference of volition and provide the means to identify the ex-
tent of promise enforcement. That description could become the basis of 
prescription, and thereby inform a restatement of the Contract relation that 
better reduces the incommensurability that increases rather than diminishes 
subject-object dissonance. We will not have honestly approached the Con-
tracts question until we confront why and how transactor sophistication and 
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the value of the consideration in issue determines the scope of the inference 
of volition. That inquiry would facilitate our putting the indicia of volition 
on a metric to reveal the bases of promise enforcement. 
Prerequisite to that reformulation is, of course, a survey of the sources 
of law that have refmed the scope of promise enforcement in evolving 
transactional settings. But such a survey will not advance the law if the ob-
ject is appreciated as simply an exercise in distillation, tying together not 
inconsistent pronouncements of general desiderata. The ameliorative 
reconception of Contract requires that the fundamental elements be estab-
lished in terms that recognize their interdependence and that do not obscure 
the possibility of recognizing the extent of enforcement in Contract gener-
ally, rather than in the exceptional cases of promissory estoppel, consequen-
tial damages, and unconscionability. 
RecoWzizing that Contract may be rationalized from a variety of per-
spectives, 02 it is worthwhile to make the elements of promise enforcement 
transparent so the formation rules and their application do not obscure the 
operation of the considerations that determine the inference of volition. If 
the rule is that we enforce a promise to achieve certain utilitarian ends, con-
sider B<PL, it is not clear what is gained by camouflaging that premise in 
our elaboration ofthe bargain calculus. Similarly, if the object of a forma-
tion rule is paternalistic, consider the consideration doctrine/03 the formula-
tion of the rule should reveal and not hide that paternalism. 
If we are able to depict utilitarian and paternalistic objectives starkly 
on an enforcement continuum, we will be able to make better sense of dis-
agreements about the extent of enforcement. We may also be able to tailor 
a better result to vindicate the right amount of paternalism on the facts pre-
sented and thereby provide more accurate bases for reliance in recurring 
transactions. And to the extent that reliance is an important justification for 
the enforcement ofpromises ab initio,204 a body of Contract formation rules 
that orders the determinants of the extent of enforcement on a common vec-
tor facilitates Contract as it diminishes the subject-object dissonance that it 
is the province of a Contract science to redress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In his insightful commentary on the methodological structures legal 
theorists have sought to impose on jurisprudential inquiry,205 Edward Rubin 
described the causes of the law's failure to find refuge in the natural sci-
202 See supra text accompanying notes 119-125. 
203 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 45-46. 
204 See id. at 38-42; see also Eric A. Posner, Law and Regret, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1470 (2000) 
("The most plausible answer to the question of why promises are enforced, is that by enforcing prom-
ises, the law enables people to make commitments that they would otherwise not be able to make, and 
these commitments allow people to obtain good things in return (cash, services, goods)."). 
205 Rubin, supra note 2. 
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ences: 
What underlies the cumulation of scientific lmowledge is a unified theory of 
causality .... 
It is precisely such a theory that legal scholars lack. They lack it because 
they are not trying to describe the causes of observed phenomena, but to 
evaluate a series of events, to express values, and to prescribe alternatives. 
This does not lend itself to the notions of causality that lie at the base of natu-
ral science and its cumulative method. It does not, moreover, involve the sort 
of statements about external reality that can be verified or falsified by data, the 
process through which the cumulation of scientific lmowledge is effected?06 
Rubin's conclusion derives from the distinction he draws between data 
(what scientists study) and events (what the law studies and regulates). For 
Rubin there is something more elemental about data: "The distinguishing 
characteristics of data, as opposed to events, is that they are generated, de-
fined, and given significance by the academic discipline that studies 
them."207 In contrast, "[j]udicial decisions, legislative enactments, and ad-
ministrative regulations . . . are neither discovered in law libraries nor un-
earthed in the field, but generated by nonacademic actors."208 
That dichotomy is ultimately unconvincing. It loses sight of the fact 
that actors' actions and reactions in a particular context, such as the context 
of commitment, are data. And for purposes of a reconception of Contract, it 
is every bit as much data as the discovered artifact. Appreciation of that rela-
tionship between the law of promise enforcement and the constituents of 
Contract is the basis of the reconception of Contract proposed in this Article. 
The argument is not that legal decisions may be studied as would be 
the interaction of elements on the periodic table. The argument is that by 
studying actors' reactions to the elements of Contract we can fashion are-
appraisal of the constituents of promise enforcement and as well develop a 
perspective to inform a reconception of those constituents and their interac-
tion that would better-more accurately, at least-depict the foundations of 
promise enforcement. It may be that such a perspective effectively converts 
Rubin's "events" into the "data" that he believes it is the province of sci-
ence to study. 
The reconception of Contract urged in this Article is a reconception in-
formed by naturalism, a means to acknowledge and confront the subject-
object dissonance that compromises the ability of extant Contract doctrine 
to respond to the challenges presented in evolving transactional contexts. It 
is, ultimately, tinkering at the level of rules to provide the common vectors 
on which we may describe reactions to issues of promise enforcement. Our 
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familiar forms frustrate realization of that object by exacerbating incom-
mensurability. Reliance on a sense of the elements of Contract in a manner 
inconsiderate of their interrelation and their ultimate conformity on an en-
forcement continuum by reference to the damage measure obscures the data 
behind the characterization of events. 
We can do better. 
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